

Thursday, July 3rd:

- 11.0 am (Mr. Ernest Meyer)  
(Came to see Mr. Connelly and saw the President, off the record.)
- 11.15 am Senator Clyde R. Hoey, N. C.  
Senator William H. Unstead, N. C.  
Senator Forrest C. Donnell, Mo.  
Senator James V. Mann, Mo.  
Congressman Carl F. Durham, N. C.  
(Senator Hoey phoned Mr. Connelly to ask if these gentlemen might call on the President to invite him to attend the Missouri-Duke Football Game this autumn.)
- 11.30 am (Honorable Fred Hauser, Attorney General of California)  
(This request was made by the Vice Chairman of the California Democratic State Committee, as well as by Mr. Ralph Pittman of this city. Mr. Hauser is a Republican but very friendly to the Administration and they feel he might be quite helpful.)
- 11.45 am (The Secretary of the Treasury)  
(Congressman Sam Rayburn, Texas)  
(Congressman Robert Doughton, N. C.)  
(Congressman Rayburn phoned Mr. Connelly yesterday to arrange for this off-the-record appointment.)
- 12.0 Honorable James L. Webb, Director, Bureau of the Budget  
Honorable Robert L. Cochran  
(The President asked that they come in.)
- 12.30 pm The Secretary of State  
(Honorable John R. Steelman)  
(The President said to have Mr. Steelman come in when the Secretary of State had his next appointment)
- 1.00 pm (Lunch)
- 2.00 pm (The President, accompanied by Admiral Leahy, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, and other guests, departed the White House by motor at 2.30 p.m. (DST) and arrived at the Woodward estate (Colle) in Charlottesville, Virginia, at 4.20 p.m. (DST), where they were greeted by their host and hostess, Mr. and Mrs. Stanley Woodward. Mr. Rose and Mr. Clifford were also guests of Mr. and Mrs. Woodward. Mr. Reineck, Mr. Ayers, and Mr. Romagna registered at the Monticello Hotel in Charlottesville. Mr. Massett did not make the trip. Secretary Snyder remained at the residence as a guest of Mr. Woodward for dinner and departed at 11.00 p.m. for the Farmington Club where he was the week-end guest of Mr. Frank K. Houston, President of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation.)

Friday, July 4th:



At the Woodward estate (Colle) in Charlottesville, Va.

- 9.50 am The President, accompanied by Admiral Leahy, Admiral Foscott, General Vaughan, Mr. Ross, and Mr. Clifford took a twenty-minute walk around the Woodward estate, returning at 10.10 a.m. Secretary Snyder arrived from the Farmington Club at 11.25 a.m.
- 11.40 am The President, accompanied by Admiral Leahy, Secretary Snyder, and other members of the party, departed the Woodward estate for Monticello. Upon arriving at the West Portico of Monticello, the President was greeted by President Frank K. Houston of the Memorial Foundation and Governor Tuck of the State of Virginia. In the presence of the other members of the Presidential party, the President was presented at this time a gavel made from the wood of a tree planted by Thomas Jefferson at Monticello. The President then delivered an address from the Portico of Monticello. Following the President's address and the conclusion of the ceremonies at Monticello, the party entered their cars for the trip to Thomas Jefferson's tomb and thence to the University of Virginia. Upon arriving at the tomb of Thomas Jefferson, the President, escorted by Mr. Frank K. Houston and accompanied by Governor Tuck, Admiral Leahy, and Honorable Colgate Darden, President of the University of Virginia, proceeded to the tomb where the President laid a wreath at the base of the tomb of Thomas Jefferson, following which he returned to his car and proceeded to the University of Virginia, arriving at 1.20 p.m.
- Upon arrival at the University of Virginia, the President was escorted by President Darden and Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, former Secretary of State, through the Rotunda, the Lawn, and to the Colonnade Club, where the President attended a luncheon given in his honor. The President and members of his party departed the Colonnade Club at 3.00 p.m. and motored direct to the Woodward estate.
- 4.05 pm The President accompanied by Secretary Snyder, Mr. Woodward, General Vaughan, and Admiral Foscott, departed Colle, the Woodward estate, and motored direct to Ash Lawn, the home of former President James Monroe, where the President laid a wreath on James Monroe's tomb. Still and newsreel pictures were taken of the wreath-laying. Following this, the President made a tour of the home of former President Monroe, and at 4.45 p.m. he and the members of his party departed Ash Lawn. Before departing the front entrance of Ash Lawn, still pictures were taken of the President driving his Cadillac convertible while other members of his party were seated therein. The President drove back to the Woodward estate, arriving at 4.50 p.m.

Friday, July 4th cont'd:



5.15 pm The President, accompanied by Secretary Snyder, Admiral Leahy, General Vuaghan, and Admiral Foskett, departed Colle in the Cadillac convertible, which the President drove, and motored to the Alumni Club on the University campus, arriving at 5.30 p.m., where the President and members of his party attended a reception given by Admiral Halsey. At 6.00 p.m., the President, with his party, departed the Alumni Club and motored direct to the Woodward estate, arriving at 6.20 p.m., where he remained for the evening. Secretary Snyder was a dinner guest this evening.

Saturday, July 5th:

9.45 a.m. The President, accompanied by Mr. Woodward, General Vaughan, and Admiral Fockett, took a walk around the estate and the immediate area, returning to the house at 10.25 a.m.

No other activities were scheduled for this day, the President and his party remaining in residence the remainder of the day. Secretary Snyder remained as an over-night house guest.

Sunday, July 6th:

8.20 am The President and members of his party, with the exception of Mr. Clifford, who had returned to Washington yesterday morning, departed the Woodward estate for the return trip to Washington. The President drove the convertible Cadillac in which Admiral Leahy, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, and General Wallace Graham were passengers. The President turned over the car to Agent Morgan Gies on the Virginia side of the Memorial Bridge for the remaining drive to the White House. The party returned to the South Portico of the White House at 12.15 p.m. (DST).



Monday, July 7th:

- 10.45 am Honorable Carl Bailey, former Governor of  
Arkansas
- 11.00 am Honorable James E. Webb, Director, Bureau of the  
Budget  
Mr. Frederick J. Lawton  
Mr. Leo C. Martin  
Mr. J. Weldon Jones
- 12.00 Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN  
(Is retiring voluntarily from the Navy - to say  
"goodbye" - arranged by Admiral Foskett)
- 12.15 pm (Ernis B. Gicker)  
(Wrote Mr. Connelly, stating he is nephew of Frank  
Ernis and Raymond Allbee, of Kansas City, friends  
of the President. He is leaving Washington July 12th  
for residence in San Francisco, after a tour of duty  
with War Department. Asked to pay respects before  
leaving.)
- 12.30 pm Honorable Paul V. McNutt
- 12.45 pm The Secretary of State  
(Usual Monday appointment)
- 1.00 pm (Lunch)
- 3.00 pm Honorable Gordon R. Clap, Chairman, Board of  
Directors, Tennessee Valley Authority  
Lt. General Raymond A. Wheeler, Chief of Engineers, USA  
Major General Lewis A. Pick, of Army Engineers  
(Dr. John Steelman)  
(Re flood control)
- 3.30 pm Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy  
(Admiral Foskett)



Tuesday, July 3th:

- 10.45 am Honorable Joseph F. Guffey, former Senator from Pa.  
(Phoned Mr. Connolly yesterday to ask for this.)
- 11.15 am Honorable Adolph A. Berle, Jr.  
(Wired Mr. Connolly from New York last week)
- 11.30 am The President received members of the Executive Committees  
and Committee Chairmen of the County Home Demonstration  
Agents Association and of the National Association  
of County Agricultural Agents:

County Agents:

H. W. Nichols  
Webster City, Iowa

A. F. MacDougall  
Concord, Mass

C. G. Kellor  
Springfield, Mo.

Paul Barger  
Waterloo, Iowa

Stuart Stirling  
Silver City, New Mexico

George Rosenfeld  
Storm Lake, Iowa

W. H. Sill  
Parkersburg, W. Va.

Edwin Bay  
Springfield, Ill.

C. F. Hall  
Olathe, Kansas

John Stephens  
Marion, Arkansas

Dwight M. Babbitt  
Flemington, N. J.

J. M. Cavender  
Jonesboro, Arkansas

A. P. Bralley  
Amarillo, Texas

S. D. Bateman  
Pt. Smith, Arkansas

E. D. Beck  
Laredo, Texas

Lew Mar Price  
Richfield, Utah

HOME DEMONSTRATION AGENTS:

Mrs. Louella Condon  
Rockwell City, Iowa

Miss Margherita Jobsen  
Hackensack, N. J.

Also present:

Mrs. A. P. Bralley  
Amarillo, Texas

Mrs. E. D. Beck  
Laredo, Texas

Mrs. W. H. Sill  
Parkersburg, W. Va.

Mrs. George Rosenfeld  
Storm Lake, Iowa

V. A. Helfenstein  
Omaha, Nebraska

Mrs. V. A. Helfenstein  
Omaha, Nebraska

Tuesday, July 8th cont'd:

11.45 am Colonel John L. Gaylord

12.15 pm (Mr. Edgar Mowrer)  
(Arranged by Mr. Ross - off record)

12.30 pm Mr. John Ben Sheppard, of Texas  
Mr. Raymond E. Roberts, Editor, Future Magazine, Publication  
of the United States Junior Chamber of Commerce, Tulsa 3,  
Oklahoma  
Mr. Frank G. Fister, Executive Vice President, U. S.  
Junior Chamber of Commerce  
(Gael Sullivan wrote Mr. Connelly in June that Mr.  
Sheppard had just been elected President of the  
Junior Chamber of Commerce; at one time very active  
in Young Democratic Clubs and how an attorney in  
Longview, Texas. Wants to talk about what the  
Junior Chamber of Commerce of Texas can do for  
the President and the 1948 campaign)

12.45 pm Honorable W. Stuart Symington  
(Wrote Mr. Connelly in June that he planned to be  
here and wanted to pay his respects to the President -  
will not stay in Washington steadily, but expects  
for a while to pay periodic visits.)

1.00 pm (Lunch)

3.30 pm (Mr. Oscar Ewing)  
(Came in yesterday to see Mr. Connelly and arranged  
this appointment. Will come, off record, to see  
Mr. Connelly)

Wednesday, July 9th:

- 10.15 am (Mr. Jacob S. Potosky)  
(Dr. John R. Steckman)  
(Mr. Potosky is President of the Amalgamated  
Clothing Workers of America.)
- 10.30 am Senator Carl A. Hatch, New Mexico  
(Phoned Mr. Connelly Monday to ask for this)
- 10.55 am (Mr. Joe Major)
- 11.00 am Msgr. John Patrick Carroll-Abbing  
(Founder and director of Boys Town of Italy and  
Acting Representative in Italy of American Relief  
for Italy. This request came from Gael Sullivan  
originally, who had received it from American  
Relief for Italy. Mr. Connelly checked it with  
the State Department, who said: "Msgr. Abbing is  
favorably known to the Department not only in  
the two capacities mentioned above, but also  
as a Vatican official. He is a United States  
citizen \* \* the Department believes it would  
be a good idea for the President to receive Msgr.  
Abbing if he has time to do so.")
- 11.15 am Honorable Burton K. Wheeler  
(Phoned Mr. Connelly for this yesterday)
- 11.45 am H. E. Senor Dr. Enrique Garcia Sayan, the Foreign  
Minister of Peru  
H. E. Senor Don Jorge Prado, the Ambassador of  
Peru  
Honorable Prentice Cooper, U.S. Ambassador to  
Peru  
Honorable Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State  
(Confidential memorandum from the State Department  
as to purpose of this visit of the Foreign Minister  
of Peru, presented to the President for his  
information. The Department recommended that Mr.  
Armour sit in on this talk, and the two Ambassadors  
asked that they be allowed to come also.)
- 12.00 The President received the National Committeemen,  
Committeewomen, Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen, from the  
States of Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma,  
Tennessee and Texas:  
ARKANSAS:  
Mr. R. B. Robins, Nat'l Committeeman, Camden  
Mrs. R. B. Robins, Camden  
Mrs. Jack Carnes, Nat'l Committeewoman, Camden  
Honorable Arthur L. Adams, State Chairman, Jonesboro  
Mrs. Carroll Johnson, Vice Chairman, Morrilton  
Mr. Carroll Johnson and Mr. Carroll Johnson, Jr.  
Hon. Harvey G. Combs, Secretary, Little Rock  
Mrs. Harvey G. Combs, Little Rock

Wednesday, July 9th cont'd:

KENTUCKY:

Honorable Keen Johnson, Nat'l Committeeman, Wash., D. C.  
Mrs. T. C. Carroll, Nat'l Committeewoman, Shepherdsville  
Hon. J. Lyter Donaldson, State Chairman, Carrollton  
Hon. William Blanton, Vice Chairman, Paris  
Mrs. Espey Goodpaster, Pres., Women's Dem. Clubs,  
Owingsville.

LOUISIANA:

Hon. Henry C. Sevier, Nat'l Committeeman, Tallulah  
Mrs. Henry C. Sevier, Tallulah  
Honorable John Fred Odom, State Chairman, Baton Rouge  
Hon. Wayles Browne, Vice Chairman, Shreveport  
Honorable and Mrs. J. E. Neale, Tallulah

OKLAHOMA:

Honorable Robert S. Kerr, Nat'l Committeeman, Oklahoma City  
Mrs. O. H. Cafky, National Committeewoman, Forgan  
Hon. H. I. Hinds, State Chairman, Oklahoma City  
Mrs. H. I. Hinds  
Mrs. Sue Ruble, Vice Chairman, Oklahoma City  
Honorable Elmer Harber, American Nat'l Bank, Shawnee  
Mrs. Elmer Harber, Shawnee  
Honorable Forest McIntire, Secretary to Governor Turner,  
Oklahoma City  
Honorable Ben Dwight

TENNESSEE:

Honorable H. S. Walters, Nat'l Committeeman, Morristown  
Mrs. Albert E. Hill, Nat'l Committeewoman, Nashville  
Hon. J. Frank Hobbs, State Chairman, Lawrenceburg  
Mrs. J. Frank Hobbs  
Mrs. Hallum W. Goodloe, Vice Chairman, Nashville  
Hon. Joe Carr, President, Young, Dem. Clubs, Nashville,  
Mrs. Joe Carr

- 12.30 pm Mrs. Ogden Reid, owner and Publisher of New York  
Herald Tribune  
(Arranged sometime ago by Mrs. Ross)
- 12.45 pm (Mr. John Goodloe, R. F. C.)  
(Came to see Mr. Connelly and saw the President,  
off the record.)
- 1.00 pm (Lunch - Secretary of the Treasury and Honorable  
James Webb, Director, Bureau of the Budget)
- 3.30 pm (Colonel Miles Knowles)
- 3.45 pm (Colonel Al Holland)
- 4.00 pm (Mr. Pete Couch)
- 4.20 pm (Honorable Bryce Smith)

Thursday, July 10th:

- 9.45 am Senator Alben M. Barkley, Ky.  
(The President told him to come up at this time)
- 10.30 am Press and Radio Conference
- 10.55 am (Mr. Tom Evans)
- 11.00 am Dr. Edwin C. Nourse, Chairman, Council of Economic  
Advisers  
Hon. Leon H. Keyserling, Vice Chairman  
Honorable John D. Clark, Member  
(Dr. Nourse phoned Mr. Connelly yesterday to ask  
for this appointment)
- 11.15 am Senator William W. Winstead, N. C.  
Mr. J. S. Gibbs, of State Highway and Public Works  
Commission of Raleigh, N. C.  
Senator Clyde Hoey, N. C.  
(Senator Winstead took up with Director Webb,  
last May, the desire of Mr. Gibbs to present a table  
to the President. Mr. Gibbs has made this table,  
which has top 35 by 55 inches on which he has inlaid  
the map of the United States from 51 species of  
rare woods in their natural color, from every corner  
of the globe.)
- 11.30 am Cadet Jack L. Capps, Co. L 2nd Regiment,  
U. S. Military Academy  
(To present the President with copy of 1947 HOWITZER,  
U. S. Military Academy annual. Received his appoint-  
ment from the President, then Senator, 1944. Is  
from Liberty, Mo. Presented this to the President  
in 1945 and 1946.)
- 11.45 am The President received the National Committeemen,  
Committeewomen and the State Presidents of the  
Young Democratic Clubs of America:  
Agnew, Mrs. Anne, Columbia, South Carolina  
Allen, Enoch S., Ironton, Ohio  
Allison, Kermit, Piler, Idaho  
Baker, Roy, Sherman, Texas  
Barrett, Kay, Texas  
Benninate, Don, Arizona  
Bornstein, Charles, Phoenix, Arizona  
Blackman, Robert, Denver, Colorado  
Blatt, Genevieve, Pittsburgh, Pa.  
Blundell, James H., Dallas Texas  
Brodemayer, Mrs. June, Portland, Oregon  
Brock, Thomas D., Detroit, Michigan  
Broughton, Thomas, Lenoir, N. C.  
Brown, Robert, Huntington Beach, Calif.

Cont'd. . . .

Thursday, July 10th cont'd:



Van Cleave, Thomas M., Kansas City, Kansas  
Vredenburg, Mrs. Dorothy, Vice President, Young  
Democratic Clubs of America, Vredenburg, Alabama  
Wallace, Robert, Columbus, Ohio  
Warren, William, Wichita, Kansas  
Warvel, Nelson, Indianapolis, Indiana  
Wemple, Edith, Midland, Texas  
Wheeler, W. Peck, Columbia, South Carolina  
White, Jack C., Iowa City, Iowa  
White, Mrs. Jack, Iowa City, Iowa  
Whitener, Basil, Gastonia, North Carolina  
Whitworth, Milton T., Elizabethtown, Kentucky  
Wiseman, Mrs. Mary Newcomer, Mansfield, Ohio  
Wood, Mrs. William, Portland, Oregon  
Wood, William D., Ogden, Utah

- 12.00 Honorable Frank P. Conroy, American Ambassador  
to Venezuela  
(Phoned Mr. Connelly direct for this)
- 12.15 pm The President signed the proclamation declaring  
Friday, August 1, 1947, AIR FORCE DAY. The following  
were present:  
Honorable W. Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary  
of War  
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Acting Deputy  
Commander, Army Air Forces  
Major General Lauris Norstad  
General James H. Doolittle
- 12.25 pm (Honorable Bryce Smith)
- 12.30 pm The Secretary of State  
(Usual Thursday appointment)
- 1.00 pm (Lunch)

Tuesday, September 23rd:

- 11.00 am The President presented the trophy to the winner of the President's Cup Regatta: The following were present:  
Senator Homer Ferguson  
Mr. Roy Dossin (Owner and Winner) (THE PEP V)  
Mrs. Roy Dossin  
Mr. Dan Foster (Driver)  
Mr. John A. Remon  
Mr. James A. Councillor  
Mr. Andrew Duffy  
Mr. C. E. Ingling  
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson Wardell  
Mr. Harry LaDuc  
Mr. Oliver J. Dupierre  
Mr. Don Anderson
- 11.30 am (Honorable Stuart Symington)  
(Mr. Arthur S. Barrows, former President, Sears Roebuck)  
(Mr. Eugene E. Zuchort, former Dean, Harvard School of Business Administration)  
(Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney)  
(General Carl Spaatz)  
(Mr. Symington asked to have this arranged, off record)
- 11.45 am Honorable James E. Webb, Director, Bureau of the Budget  
(Phoned Mr. Connelly yesterday for this)
- 12.00 H.R.H. Crown Prince Olav of Norway  
The Ambassador of Norway
- 12.30 pm The Secretary of Agriculture  
(Asked Mr. Connelly to arrange this Saturday)
- 1.00 pm The President motored to Office of Attorney General for surprise birthday luncheon--Attorney General's Birthday)
- 3.30 pm (The Postmaster General)
- 4.15 pm (Honorable Edwin Pauley)
- 7.20 pm (The President left for Mayflower Hotel to attend Dinner of Business Advisory Council)

Wednesday, September 24th:

10.45 am Senator Harley Kilgore, W. Va.  
(Phoned Mr. Connolly last Monday to ask for this)

11.00 am Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, Chairman Council of Economic  
Advisers  
(Wants to discuss his quarterly report)

11.15 am Honorable David A. Morse, The Under Secretary  
of Labor  
(To discuss question of a new Assistant Secretary  
of Labor; also testimony requested from the Chief  
of Bureau of Labor Statistics)

11.30 am Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense  
Dr. Vannevar Bush  
(Arranged at suggestion of Secretary Forrestal)

11.45 am (Mr. Blevins Davis)  
(Arranged by Miss Conway)

12.00 The Secretary of Agriculture

12.15 pm (Father George King)  
(Mr. Jim Lillis)

12.30 pm The President received the following Members of  
the Board of Directors of the American Overseas  
Aid and United Nations Appeal for Children:

Adams, Orson, Jr.,	Blanchard, Ralph
Arnold, Edward	Burns, Allen T.
Athenagoras, Archbishop	Briscoe, Mr. Sherman
Aydelotte, Frank	Cashen, T. C. Chr.,
Batt, William L.	Chamberlain, Dr. Joseph
Biddle, Clement M.	Cihak, Mrs. Blanche J.
Bookman, C. M.	Crowley, Leo T.
Brannaman, Ray H.	Curllett, John N.
Bell, Daniel	Davis, Chester C.
Brown, Edward E.	deForest, Col. L. Effingham
Broyles, Reverend Vernon	Deupree, R. R., Pres.
Bruere, Henry, Pres.	Douglass, Dr. Paul., F.
Dyke, Ken R.	Ewing, Oscar Ross
Lenroot, Katharine	Graham, Frank P.
Lewis, W. E.	Green, William
Linton, Albert	Hollander, Sidney
Luce, Henry R.	Hardaloupas, Evangelos
McCabe, Thomas G.	Haratschfeger, Walter
Miller, Dr. Kenneth D.	Harrison, George M.
Mitchell, Dr. Eva	Helis, William G.
Ingraham, Mrs. Henry A.	Nelson, Donald
Kellogg, Mrs. Vernon	O'Boyle, Rt. Rev. Msgr. Patrick A.
Killian, J. R. Jr.	O'Shea, William J.

Wednesday, September 24th:



Kirk, Maj. General Norman T.	Paterson, Chat
Faist, Mrs. William	Pickett, Clarence E.
Koch, Rev. Henry C.	Arthur Ringland
Post, John	Dallas, Dort
Riley, Charles W.	Howard Hunter
Salmon, Clarke	Rule, Victor A.
Chroder, William J.	Moore, MacEnnis
Skouras, Spyros	Brunot, James
Smith, Russell	Owen, Charlotte
Stephanidis, Stephen	Swanstrom, Very Rev. Msgr. Edward
Swanstrom, Very Rev. Msgr. Edward	Rooney, Miss R.
Swietlik, Dr. Francis X.	Taylor, S. Gregory
Taft, Charles P.	Warnshuis, Dr. A. L.
Vandusen, Dr. Henry P.	

- 12.45 pm Honorable George Schoene, an  
Mr. and Mrs. Vernon H. Gaston
- 1.00 pm (Lunch)
- 3.00 pm Cabinet  
(Lovett for State, Morse for Labor and Wiggins  
for Treasury. General Fleming absent. All  
others present.)
- 4.00 pm Honorable Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State  
Honorable William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State
- 5.20 pm (Honorable George Allen)
- 7.45 pm (The President attended a Play and Dinner at  
Gadsby's Tavern, Alexandria, Virginia, given  
by General and Mrs. Harry Vaughan)

## **NEW EVIDENCE OBTAINED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF UFOs**

-- The BLT Research Team  
has provided new evidence of hemoglobin at bovine  
mutilation sights. There  
is also exciting new evidence from the message held  
in General Ramey's hand  
that a disk crashed at Roswell.

**TWENTY UFO SIGHTINGS OVER TEXAS.** Twenty sightings  
of triangles, cylinders,  
fireballs and discs in the last several weeks indicate  
an Alien interest in  
Texas. Perhaps they wish to help us remember the  
tragedy at Waco and the  
deaths of some 60 women and children who died when  
government tanks spitting  
gas attacked the Branch Davidian Church. Five percent  
of our total US  
sightings are over Texas.

## **NEW EVIDENCE ON ROSWELL CRASH**

Tom Carey writes that a correction should be made  
on the message held in  
General Ramey's hand in and photographed by J. Bond  
Johnson on July 8, 1947.  
Dave Rudiak's line #4 which is a key line to the message  
should read:

**" \*\*\*\* S\*S IN THE "DISK" THEY WILL SHIP FOR A1-8TH  
ARMY AF\*\*"**

The key phrase here is "in the disk" referring to  
something that was inside  
as well as to where it was being shipped to General  
Ramey who is the A-1 at  
Ft. Worth. What kind of balloon or radar target carries  
something inside?

Dave Rudiak is "absolutely certain" that the memo was addressed to Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg at the Pentagon who at the time was deputy chief of the Army Air Force. With the new scan, Rudiak was able to make out several letters in Vandenberg's name above Ramey's thumb which protrudes into the text of the memo. This ties in neatly with the following statement on page 57 of "THE TRUTH ABOUT THE UFO CRASH AT ROSWELL" by Randle and Schmitt concerning General Vandenberg: "The Associated Press reported that Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Deputy chief of the Army Air Forces (AAF), hurried to AAF press section in Washington to take active charge of the news about the find in New Mexico." The message is addressed To: Vandenburg

- 1)\*\*\*\*\*NEAR OPERATION AT THE
- 2) \*\*RAN)CH AND THE VICTIMS OF THE WRECK YOU FORWARDED TO THE
- 3) \*\*\*T)EAM AT FORT WORTH, TEX.
- 4) \*\*\*\*\*S\*S IN THE "DISK" THEY WILL SHIP FOR A1-8TH ARMYAF\*\*
- 5) BY B29-ST OR C47. WRIGHT AF ASSIST FLIGHTS AT ROSWELL. ASSURE
- 6) THAT CIC-TEAM SAID THIS MISTAKEN MEANING OF STORY AND THINK
- 7) LATE TODAY NEXT SENT OUT PR OF WEATHER BALLOONS WOULD WORK
- 8) BETTER IF THEY ADD LAND DEMO RAWIN CREWS.

Signed Ramey

**EDITORS NOTE:** Again I wish to thank those research groups, Dave Rudiak, Tom Carey and Don Schmitt, Don Burleson, Neil Morris and the Roswell Photo Interpretation Team that are making new evidence available to us. Vandenberg was Deputy Commander, US Army Air Forces in 1947.

Later he became Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. A review of his official daily activities calendar revealed he returned from Wichita Falls, Texas on July 5, 1947, less than a hundred miles from Ft. Worth, Texas. On Monday, July 7, General Vandenberg's Dairy is full of UFO reports, and he spends most of the day taking care of a flying saucer recovery in Houston, TEXAS, an incident that he later claims was a hoax. One entry sticks out. He asked General Van what he thought the flying discs were and General Van was quite noncommittal. General Van said that "Some National Guard planes were put on duty on their own volition to search for the discs, but no planes have been put on duty from Hq. AAF." It is possible this was a simple code to remind him of the exact date for Roswell and where it was being shipped.

On Tuesday, July 8, Col. Blanchard announces to the world press a flying saucer has been captured near Roswell, NM. Late afternoon J. Bond Johnson takes General Ramey's photograph in Fort Worth with a copy of the message apparently just sent to Vandenberg in his hand. Vandenberg's Dairy reports he returned from Congressman Wolverton's office at 5:07 PM and went immediately to Secretary of the Army Air Force Mr Symington's Office with reference to personnel for the President's Air Board. At 6:20 PM went to Mr. Leo's office and then home. It is not known what the President's Air Board means and may refer to UFOs. He should have received Ramey's message by then or first thing Wednesday morning.

On Wednesday, July 9, General Vandenberg's Dairy reports he talked with

General Doolittle on the phone and told him to come in at 10:30 AM. He met with Mr. Symington apparently with Doolittle at 10:30. At 10:50 he met with General Eisenhower Army Chief of Staff, and General Norstad Psychological Operations. At 12:15 he met again with Mr. Symington. At 12:15 Vandenberg is called by the White House and told to be there the next day. His diary also says at 2:15 PM: Vandenberg returned from JCS (Joint Chief of Staffs) and met again with Symington. At 3:40 he met with General Gardner, General Power and Col. Peterson. He does not mention handling the UFO situation but, General Doolittle is known to have investigated UFO sightings in Sweden. General Vandenberg's Dairy indicates he meets with virtually all key military personnel in Washington DC and something very important was happening. It should be noted that Vandenberg is concerned that the Air Force was becoming a separate service in a few weeks and he was attempting to obtain funding for 70 Groups. Congress appeared to cutting the Air Force to only 55 groups. Publicizing the new possible threat from UFOs could help increase Air Force funding. The message stating that there were both victims of the wreck and shipping a disk speaks volumes.

weird kit of tools under his arm, descended into the cavernous bomb bay. There, in its special cradle, lay a black metallic monster of the approximate size and shape of a baby whale. It was known variously to the chosen few who had ever laid eyes on it as "Thin Boy," or "The Thing." It was wholly dormant and innocuous as Captain Parsons clambered down into its nest. Only the night before, four B-29's in succession had crashed trying to take off from Tinian. If the *Enola Gay*, with its special cargo, had suffered a like fate, a properly activated "Thin Boy" probably would have blown a good part of Tinian Island off the map. So Captain Parsons, one of the few men around who had been trained at Alamogordo, volunteered at the last minute to fuse the world's first airborne atomic bomb while in flight. He hoped reverently to God that he knew how, and that he could do it in time. He was far from certain.

Four alternative targets in the Japanese homeland were circled on the chart that Colonel Tibbets carried on his lap. An hour ahead of him were three reconnaissance planes to scout the weather over each target. Clear visibility from 30,000 feet was a requisite for this greatest of all air strikes. As daylight crept up out of the eastern horizon and spread across the sky, the *Enola Gay's* navigator, Captain Theodore Van Kirk, was advised by radio code that conditions over Target One, the city of Hiroshima, were ideal. He and Colonel Tibbets set their course accordingly, and the bombardier, Major Thomas W. Ferebee, got into position behind his bombsight. "Zero instant" had been calculated for 9:15 o'clock. At 8:50 the shoreline of Honshu, the main Japanese island, swept past in brilliant sunlight far beneath them. At 9:11, with the two accompanying observation planes deployed a mile away, one on each side, the *Enola Gay* reached her "initial point" for a straight run directly over her target.

What premonitory emotions and anxieties gripped the men aboard is not recorded—whether they shouted "Bombs Away!" "There she goes!" "Take this, you bastards!" or anything at all. William L. Laurence, on special military leave from the New York *Times* as press officer for the Manhattan Engineer District, was the only reporter with a next-to-eyewitness proximity to this awesome venture. From his privileged listening post in the main communications center at Tinian, he followed the minute-by-minute progress of the flight and interviewed the crew when they returned that afternoon. He captured some of the drama in these words:

The *Enola Gay* had a four-minute run on a perfectly open target. Maj. Ferebee manipulated the cross hairs on his bomb sight until the target

was at the intersection between his course line and his rate line. The great moment had come. He synchronized on Hiroshima and let go. . . .

Those inside the *Enola Gay* first saw a little pinpoint of light, purplish red. In an instant the pinpoint grew into a giant ball of purple fire, a half mile in diameter. The great fireball suddenly exploded into a huge mass of swirling flames and purple clouds. Out of it came giant concentric white rings of fog, as though the earth itself were blowing mighty smoke rings.

Suddenly out of the swirling purple cloud came a huge column of smoke. . . . Then came another phase. The ten-thousand-foot column suddenly grew into a giant mushroom, with tremendous clouds of dust swirling about its base for a distance of three miles. . . .

At exactly 9:15 this morning Hiroshima stood out under the clear blue sky. One tenth of a millionth of a second later, a time imperceptible by any clock, it had been swallowed by a cloud of swirling fire as though it had never existed. The best watches made by man still registered 9:15.<sup>1</sup>

Halfway around the world, the United States destroyer *Augusta* was a day out of Norfolk, bringing the almost-brand-new thirty-second President of the United States home from his first international conference, at Potsdam. As he sat at lunch on August 6 with the ship's crew, an officer handed him a radiogram that had just been received. It read:

To The President

From the Secretary of War

Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 5 at 7:15 P.M. Washington time.\* First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.

In later years, the President recalled:

When I read this I signalled to the crew in the mess hall that I wished to say something. I then told them of the dropping of a powerful new bomb which used an explosive twenty thousand times as powerful as a ton of TNT. . . . I could not keep back my expectation that the Pacific war might now be brought to a speedy end.<sup>2</sup>

The decision to atomize Hiroshima not only brought the war in the Pacific to a speedy end but did much, much more.

Joseph Stalin probably knew more about America's atomic-bomb project than Harry Truman did when he became President. In fact

\* August 5 in the Western Hemisphere is August 6 in the Eastern.

Truman did not even know it existed on the evening when he was sworn in, and it was almost two weeks later before he was to get his first full-dress briefing on the mysterious operations of the Manhattan Engineer District (the administrative euphemism behind which this greatest of wartime gambles was concealed) from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson. Yet, in less than three months he would be called upon to make the most awesome decision any President had ever been asked to make—whether to loose this most terrifying weapon ever devised by man upon human targets.

No man has ever walked with less preparation into a greater tangle of problems than did Truman when he stepped across that anomalous Constitutional threshold that separates the figurehead Vice Presidency from the towering and lonely responsibility of the Presidency. Since his inauguration in January, he had seen President Roosevelt privately only three times, and each occasion was brief and inconsequential. In his established role as presiding officer of the Senate he was almost totally isolated from the flow of issues and decisions in the executive branch of government, save as they directly concerned legislation. What he knew of the grand strategies of war and peace, then approaching an apocalyptic climax, he picked up largely from the papers and the gossip of the Senatorial cloakrooms.

"The President," Woodrow Wilson wrote nearly half a century ago, "is at liberty both in law and in conscience to be as big a man as he can."

But a Vice President can be only as big a man as his President wants, or permits, him to be. FDR groomed no one to be his successor, and if he ever regarded Harry Truman as anything more than a congenial makeweight on the Democratic ticket in 1944, the fact is lost to history. Nor is there much evidence that the Vice President himself contemplated or tried to prepare for the historic crisis that enveloped him on that April evening in 1945. At a later time he said:

I felt that I had lived five lifetimes in my first five days as President. I was beginning to realize how little the Founding Fathers had been able to anticipate the preparations necessary for a man to become President so suddenly. It is a mighty leap from the Vice Presidency to the Presidency when one is forced to make it without warning. Under the present system a Vice President cannot equip himself to become President merely by virtue of being second in rank.<sup>3</sup>

Of all the vast complexities that leaped out at Truman when he was thrust into the White House, none was more formidable demanding than the A-bomb. The conduct of the war was, in relative sense, in the hands of the generals and the admirals; was no question but that the formative work on the United Nations should go forward; and domestic affairs could, if need be, continue to operate under their own momentum, for a time at least. But the discovery and harnessing of atomic energy involved uniquely personal responsibilities for the President. Only a handful of men of tens of thousands engaged on the atomic program, knew its dimensions or were able to guess at its limitless implications; each major step in this two-billion-dollar fantasy required the President's personal consent. And he alone, in all the world, must say Yes or No to that awesome, ultimate question, "Shall we drop the bomb on a living target?"

Among the few people in the world who did know, however imperfectly, what was going on at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Alamos, New Mexico, and at Hanford, Washington, were Premier Stalin and his top associates in the Kremlin. They had enjoyed more than a year fairly accurate and up-to-date intelligence supplied them through the espionage network served by the German physicist Klaus Fuchs, who was attached to the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) in a highly responsible and confidential role. (This desolate fact was not known to American authorities until several years later, when Fuchs was caught at his spy work by the British.) Senator Truman almost blundered into the spy company of the informed in mid-1944. As Chairman of the Senate War Investigating Committee, he decided to send his investigators down to see what was happening to the hundreds of millions of dollars of appropriated funds being swallowed up by a hush-hush operation in Eastern Tennessee. He was dissuaded just in time by the personal plea of Secretary Stimson, who came in for agitation to his office and told him: "Senator, I can't tell you what it is, but it is the greatest project in the history of the world. It is a top secret. Many of the people who are actually engaged in the work have no idea what it is, and we who do would appreciate your not going into those plants."

Almost a year later—the date was April 25, 1945—Stimson was relieved to be able to go to the White House and tell the President in detail what the state of progress on the A-bomb was and to speculate about its enormous implications. Almost at

outset of the MED program in 1941, Stimson had been designated by President Roosevelt to be his chief civilian liaison with the scientists and military men carrying on the work. On this visit to the White House, he brought with him Major General Leslie R. Groves, the chief administrative officer of the project, who explored the main technical aspects of the work for the new President.

The substance of Groves' report was that, as the culmination of five years of totally unparalleled scientific effort, a workable atomic bomb was now almost a certainty. The remaining doubts, he said, would be resolved sometime after the middle of July when an actual test explosion would be attempted in the New Mexico desert. If it succeeded at all, this explosion would yield an equivalent force of about 500 tons of TNT. Thereafter, he went on, the first "operational" bomb would be ready for use around the first of August. And—in what turned out to be a historic understatement—this one should have twice the killing force of its prototype, or the equivalent of 1,000 to 1,200 tons of TNT. It was a 20,000-ton bomb that hit Hiroshima, and "Thin Boy" was already obsolete before it was dropped.

(Not every one shared General Groves' optimism. Admiral William D. Leahy, the crusty old sea rover who had stayed on briefly as White House Military Adviser after FDR's death, also sat in on the briefing for Truman that morning. When Stimson and Groves had departed, he warned the President: "The damn thing will never go off, and I say that as an expert on explosives." Some of the scientific people of the MED were equally, if less picturesquely, skeptical.)

For his part of the discussion that morning, Secretary Stimson dwelt less on the weaponry aspects of atomic energy than on the larger questions of its place in broad military and political strategy and the moral implications of America's monopoly of it.<sup>4</sup> (The British and Canadians were junior partners in the enterprise, but the essential techniques had been developed by the United States.) There was first, he said, the issue of whether such a terrifying weapon should be used at all. Beyond this was the question of our obligation to humanity as the custodians of this secret cosmic force, and how that custodianship was to be exercised in a postwar world full of jealousies and tensions. He urged the President to look beyond the immediate prospect of the first man-made atomic blast to the tremendous long-range ramifications that would begin immediately to ensue. At Stimson's suggestion, Mr. Truman agreed to the prompt creation of a special committee of distinguished civilians to

study, and to advise him on, the whole range of moral and political issues presented by the emergence of atomic energy as a totally new aspect of civilization.

Rarely has there been a government committee of higher caliber than the so-called Interim Committee which resulted from this tall Stimson, whose record of public service went back to the Taft administration, was its chairman, and on its roster were such names as James M. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and War Mobilization and soon to become Secretary of State; Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and James B. Conant, who left the presidency of Harvard to become chairman of the National Defense Research Committee. Serving in an advisory capacity were several of the brightest luminaries from the new science of nuclear physics—such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Arthur H. Compton, each of whom had had a commanding role in the capture of atomic energy.

The minutes and final report of this group are still classified and beyond common reach, but Herbert Feis<sup>5</sup> has done a thorough job of piecing together the proceedings from many competent sources. There were, he says, two basic items on the agenda: (1) how this new source of energy (characterized by Stimson as having "more effect on human affairs than the theory of Copernicus and the law of gravity") was to be controlled internationally, particularly with respect to Russia; and (2) how the bomb was to be used in the war against Japan (Germany now being on the brink of defeat).

On the first proposition, the committee was unable to arrive at a clear-cut consensus. Opinions varied all the way from the argument that it should be jealously hoarded as an exclusive American secret with this country assuming the Messianic role of enforcer of the world's peace, to the opposite extreme where we would immediately take the Russians into our confidence and, with them, deliver the secret into the hands of an international commission under the control of the United Nations.

As one reviews the rationale of these arguments that took place in such tense secrecy two decades ago (to me, there is an antic parallel here to the opening witch scene of *Macbeth*), one is ruefully reminded of how much of its time mankind spends going nowhere on a treadmill. The arguments have not changed, and the dilemma is the same in 1965 as it was in 1945: How shall we control atomic energy? How shall we blunt its power for evil and sharpen its poten-

tial for good? How, indeed, can we save ourselves from immolation on an atomic pyre that we have built and fueled with our own hands? These awesome questions have not been answered through countless hours of international wrangling, bullying, and negotiation, nor through prayer, nor through "peace strikes," nor through the scientists' blind search for a damper or counterforce against the atomic holocaust. On this, as on so many stubborn cold war issues, that evolved in the late 1940's, we are still pumping that treadmill.

On the second proposition, raised by the Interim Committee, a sharper consensus *did* emerge: that the bomb should be used as soon as possible against a major military target to force Japan promptly to her knees. There were both pros and cons to this, of course. Most importantly, a group of scientists at the atomic project in Chicago, headed by Leo Szilard, protested vehemently against the debasement of their efforts by turning it to the lethal purposes of warfare. They also argued strongly against the doctrine of an atomic monopoly, pointing out that the principles of atomic fission were already known to scientists in many parts of the world. Any effort by this country to hoard its knowledge of atomic energy, they said, would only feed the envious and probably warlike determination of other nations to develop the bomb for themselves.\*

✓ Another viewpoint commanding attention was that the bomb should be employed against Japan, but only by means of a nonlethal demonstration in the ocean or on a deserted island. There was general revulsion within the committee, according to Secretary Stimson's recollections, against the idea of the mass slaughter that would result from bombing a populated center. But weighing against this was the prospect that the conventional ground, sea, and air attack then being waged against the fanatical Japanese would take at least another year and possibly as many as one million American and British casualties before victory could be achieved. One or maybe two well-placed atomic bombs should, on the other hand, end the war in a matter of days.

✓ As for the alternative of a harmless demonstration, there were sound arguments against that, too. To make it effective, the event would have to be widely billed in advance so that the enemy could see the awesome blast, or at least know about it and be properly intimidated. But in the then current state of atomic science, there

\* Atomic "proliferation" is a greater concern to Washington as this is being written (1965) than the imminence of atomic war. Besides the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and Communist China now possess atomic weapons.

was no absolute assurance that this primitive device would go off as planned, or that the delivering plane and its crew would not be demolished in the process. Such an eventuality, it was reasoned, would be a mortal blow to the image of Allied invincibility probably would encourage Japan to fight on more determined than ever. It could also, it was believed, cause the Russians, who had promised at the Yalta Conference to get into the war against Japan three months after Hitler was disposed of, to drag their feet. ✓ There was, after all, in that baleful, tortured summer of 1945, one overriding objective to American world policy: to whip Japan and end the war in the shortest time with the least possible cost in men and money. The debate in the Interim Committee therefore resolved itself in forwarding to the President the following historical conclusion on what to do about the atomic bomb: "*We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war. We can see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.*"<sup>8</sup>

The controversy over the moral rightness of this conclusion never ceased. But it seemed not greatly to trouble President Truman, to whom it was clear and logical that bombs to be used in a war against the Axis had always been the end purpose of this whole gigantic effort.

Thus reinforced, he embarked aboard the *Augusta* on July 7: his first meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin at Potsdam. Their basic purpose was to correlate plans for a peaceful Europe (V-E Day had occurred on May 8) and for finishing the war in the Pacific. On the evening of the 16th, Stimson, who had followed the President over by air, handed him, at the "Little White House," in Potsdam a message just received from General Groves at Alamogordo, New Mexico. In strictly homemade code, it read as follows: "Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations." To Prime Minister Churchill's headquarters, the Secretary sent this meaningful paraphrase: "Babies satisfactorily born." Both meant the same thing: The static test in the New Mexico desert had handsomely succeeded. The atom bomb was a reality at last.

Now only three important steps had to be taken before the doomsday bell would be tolled.

On the 24th, President Truman at Potsdam OK'd what amounted to the final orders for the *Enola Gay's* historic flight. Directed by General Carl A. Spaatz, Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic

Air Forces, and signed by General Thomas C. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff, the orders read in part:

The 509th Composite Group, 20th Air Force [the atomic strike force] will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August, 1945, on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. . . . Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. . . . Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

Next was the problem of what and how to tell Stalin, now that the secret of the bomb was about to unfold itself. Truman and Churchill conferred anxiously about this. Their dilemma was to convey to the smilingly treacherous old dictator just enough to head off his complaints that his allies had bypassed him, but not enough to reveal the true nature of the weapon. (They put off to an uncertain tomorrow facing up to the ultimate political realities raised by the bomb.) So, at the conclusion of their formal Big Three session on the 24th, Truman strolled nonchalantly around the table to where the Russian leader was chatting with some of his aides.

"I casually mentioned to Stalin," the President has recalled, "that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no particular interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.'"

Truman and Churchill chortled smugly over their coup as they left the conference together, blissfully ignorant that the enigmatic Russian Premier had scored a point in one-upmanship against them. What he could have said, but didn't, was: "So? I've known about it all along."

Finally, there was the question of whether the Japanese could be induced to surrender before the A-bomb was used against them. The country had already been hammered into near helplessness. Tokyo and dozens of Japan's other major cities had been turned into charred shells by the massive fire raids of the B-29's. Its navy and its air force had been reduced by the summer of 1945 to virtual impotency. Only its army remained strong, and it was known that the fanatical Japanese soldiery could make an invasion of the Japanese homeland a costly and long-drawn-out butchery. While there had been some tentative and ambiguous peace feelers from Tokyo by way of Moscow, the Allies insisted on "unconditional surrender" as

the sole price of peace. (Churchill demurred over this rigidity, since the United States was carrying the main burden of the Pacific fighting, he let the President have his way.)

The text of a proposed ultimatum to the Japanese rulers had been drawn in Washington several weeks earlier. Truman gave Churchill's assent to it on the scene at Potsdam; and the assent of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist Chinese leader, by radio. The ultimatum contained no hint of an atomic bombing, but sternly promised the destruction of the Japanese homeland, just as Germany had been destroyed, unless the terms of unconditional surrender were immediately met. The ultimatum (later known as the Potsdam Declaration) was issued on the evening of July 26, and its content was beamed to Japan repeatedly for the next twenty-four hours by the powerful radio transmitters of the Office of War Information on Saipan. Three nights later, millions of leaflets were dropped over Japan from B-29 Flying Fortresses. They repeated the substance of the Declaration, with an ominous new note added. Eleven cities were listed, of which at least four would shortly be picked for total destruction from the air. "Attention Japanese People," the leaflets read, "Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or a friend."

It is now known that there was a violent split within the Japanese governing hierarchy at this time in late July over whether to continue the unequal struggle or to give up. The fate of the Emperor and his sacred status, which the Allies had failed to clarify in the surrender terms, seems to have weighed powerfully in behalf of those who counseled a fight to the death. At all events, it was the side that prevailed. Premier Suzuki disclosed the government's official position when he told Japanese reporters on the afternoon of July 29: "I believe the joint proclamation of the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war."

His defiant words, broadcast to the world, stamped "Go" on the flight orders of the *Enola Gay*.

The bomb that exploded a thousand feet above Hiroshima killed upwards of 78,000 people, most of them instantly, which was nearly twice as great as the number who survived with injuries. It destroyed practically every house within a three-mile radius of the target, or about 99 percent of the city's buildings. The sec-

making it more responsive to popular sentiment. . . . My future work will be concerned almost exclusively with domestic policy matters and with efforts to transform the political economy of our domestic institutions."<sup>38</sup>

The truth is that, after stimulating much comment with a dramatic thesis and after engaging in several polemical articles in the *New York Review of Books* and so irritating Herbert Feis that the latter in his book on the origins of the Cold War refused to mention the author of *Atomic Diplomacy* by name, Alperovitz could not prove his major contention. Adam Ulam, in a caustic analysis of "Dr. Alperovitz," has written,

One would expect Alperovitz to adduce at least a single instance of an American negotiator saying in effect to a Russian during the period in question (1945-46), "You ought to remember we have the bomb," or "If you go easy on the Poles we might share our nuclear know-how with you." Or he might offer a public statement by an American official that "the Russians ought to keep in mind before they go too far in Rumania that we have this weapon." Dr. Alperovitz does not cite any such instances because there weren't any.<sup>39</sup>

His supporters were reduced to saying that Alperovitz had widened their horizons, had made them see that some officials in the United States Government had believed that the threat of the atomic bomb might help them resolve their troubles with the Russians. Alperovitz was reduced to relying on the powers of psychology: Possession of the bomb, he declared, influenced American officials more than they knew or said. In a sideways movement in one of his *New York Review* essays, Alperovitz also took refuge in logic. American military leaders, he remarked, believed the bomb unnecessary for victory over Japan, but the United States Government failed to reassess the military situation. Why did "the momentum remain when the military reasons disappeared?" Answer: "A diplomatic momentum had by this time taken control of policy."<sup>40</sup>

By the time he had made his retreat, half of the graduate students in the country were believing his original thesis and the other half were looking for holes in his argument. One of the latter at the University of Tennessee found that in Alperovitz's claim that on June 18, 1945, Truman's military advisers had agreed that Japan could be forced to surrender unconditionally without the use of the bomb and without an invasion (and the diplomatic momentum was, therefore, about to set in) and had quoted General Marshall as saying, "The impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action

levering them into capitulation," he had trimmed the quotation so give it a quite different meaning from what Marshall intended.<sup>41</sup> But as the Tennessee sharpshooter was about to draw a bead on Alperovitz the *enfant terrible* of 1965 was, as mentioned, rapidly disappearing the historiographical horizon.

## 3

Revisionist critics of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era encountered three problems or issues or aspects of policy that can be traced to a decision in the year 1946 that bothered them in varying degree. Like the contentions discussed in preceding pages, these also are worth close notice in what by this juncture may be beginning to appear as an effort to knock down every theory the revisionists have put up. Frankly, at the risk of appearing to be a traditionalist, a defender of received truth and a victim of Cold War rhetoric (after all, is there not *some* merit

<sup>41</sup>Alperovitz needs to show that there was no military justification for the bomb. This is his key piece of evidence, because it would mean that President Truman obviously had ulterior reasons for using atomic weapons. On pp. 237-38 of *Atomic Diplomacy*, Alperovitz writes as follows: "Before the atomic bomb was dropped each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that it was highly likely that Japan could be forced to surrender 'unconditionally,' without use of the bomb and without an invasion. [Alperovitz's italics.] In fact, this characterization of the position taken by the senior military advisers was a conservative one. General Marshall's June 18 appraisal was the most cautiously phrased advice offered by any of the Joint Chiefs: 'The impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation. The ellipsis points at the end of this quotation are Alperovitz's, after which he passes the opinion of Admiral Leahy. For the quotation from Marshall, Alperovitz cites Potsdam documents in *Foreign Relations*, but from a careful reading of *Foreign Relations: The Conference of Berlin, 1945, I* (Washington, 1960), 905, the same page used by Alperovitz, it is clear that Marshall anticipated the necessity of American troops landing on Kyushu, an operation then being planned for November 1, and that it might be necessary to land troops on Honshu, the island containing Tokyo, which landing eventually was scheduled for April 15, 1946. Following is a properly full quotation of Marshall's opinion (in the document the general was reading, the design of "Japan" meant the Honshu landing): "There is reason to believe that the first 30,000 men in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that it is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leader to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in their subordinates. . . . [Ellipsis marks in original.] An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan." Alperovitz omitted these final, italicized words and failed to print the preceding two sentences, lifting his quotation completely out of context. I am greatly indebted to John Garry Clifford of the University of Connecticut who in 1968-1969 taught at Tennessee and devoted part of a seminar to the Alperovitz book, for calling my attention to this use of quotation.

<sup>38</sup>*Cold War Essays*, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup>"On Modern History: Re-reading the Cold War," excerpted in Paterson, ed., *Origins of the Cold War*, p. 115.

<sup>40</sup>*Cold War Essays*, p. 3. The psychology is on p. 71: "Thus it appears that the natural military assumption that the bomb would be used became intermeshed with diplomatic strategy in a way so subtle it was probably not completely understood by the participants themselves."

NWII  
Lamb

"Always has been," Dad said. "It is one of our weapons."

The truth, of course, as Dad had indicated in his previous comment, was that the atomic bomb would be used only as a last desperate resource. But he hoped that the threat of using it would force the Chinese to move more cautiously.

Now the reporters, sniffing a story, really went to work on him. "Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives or civilian?" Robert G. Nixon of International News Service asked. Note the neat way that question penned my father into a corner. He tried to extricate himself by saying that was "a matter that the military people have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things."

My father was thinking of the way targets were selected for the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. He had ordered his military advisers to select authentic military targets, and they had done so. He was trying to avoid the implication that he or anyone else would willingly drop a bomb on a purely civilian target. He was trying to do this in a nice way, without cutting down Bob Nixon.

"Mr. President," said Frank Bourholtzer, "you said this depends on United Nations action. Does that mean that we wouldn't use the atomic bomb except under United Nations authorization?"

This question tried to pin Dad into another corner. Numerous congressmen, mostly Republicans, were extremely touchy about the agreements which President Roosevelt had made with the British, giving them a say in the use of the atom bomb. When those agreements expired in 1946, Congress had absolutely refused to renew them. In fact, their intransigence had forced Dad to break off all direct relations with British research in atomic energy. Struggling to avoid giving his home-front critics political ammunition, Dad replied: "No, it doesn't mean that at all. The action against Communist China depends on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has."

Here my father was trying to say that even a UN army had permission to use all the weapons in its arsenal, if its survival was at stake.

None of the reporters tried to pursue these questions beyond the single answer my father gave them. There was no indication that the subject was considered the main theme of the press con-

ference. They again went on to other things and the conference ended with a plea from Dad for the reporters and the nation to understand that "we have exerted every effort possible to prevent a third World War. Every maneuver that has been made since June 25 has had in mind not to create a situation which would cause another terrible war. We are still trying to prevent that war from happening."

The reporters departed and within minutes, the UP began carrying the following bulletin: "PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDER CONSIDERATION USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR IN KOREA."

The AP was just as bad: "PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB AGAINST THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IF THAT STEP IS NECESSARY."

Only much later in the message did the AP explain the context of Dad's remarks on the atomic bomb and make it clear that they were *not* in the prepared statement which he had made on Chinese intervention, at the beginning of the conference. Charlie Ross hastily summoned reporters to his office and sternly told them that the story's implication—that new consideration of the atomic bomb was in the works, because of the Chinese intervention—was simply not true.

Meanwhile, the AP ticker kept piling distortion on distortion: "HE SAID . . . THE DECISION OF WHETHER TO DROP ATOMIC BOMBS WAS ONE FOR THE COMMANDER IN THE FIELD."

From New York the AP sent orders to its Washington Bureau to jump this to the top of the story. It now read as follows:

FIRST LEAD TRUMAN KOREA

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 30TH—(AP) PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN KOREA HAS ALWAYS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION—AND WHETHER IT IS USED IS UP TO AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERS IN THE FIELD. . . .

An appalled Charlie Ross hastily put together a clarifying statement—but the damage had been done. The afternoon papers carried huge headlines making it sound as if my father were shipping A-bombs to MacArthur with a carte blanche to use them—the last thing in the world he would have done at such a moment. In Europe the story created an even bigger sensation. Italian

Margaret Truman

William Monro & Co. Inc

New York 1973

papers declared that bombers loaded with atom weapons were ready to take off from Japanese airfields. The *Times of India* ran an editorial under the heading, "NO, NO, NO." London went into the biggest flap. The House of Commons had been debating foreign policy for two days, and Mr. Churchill and other Conservative leaders had been urging Prime Minister Attlee to go to America and confer with my father on Britain's numerous problems. When the news of the atom bomb story reached the House, the left wing of the Labour party immediately circulated a petition, which collected a hundred signatures, declaring that if Attlee supported Dad's supposed atomic intentions, they would bolt the party and bring down the government. A panicked Attlee announced that he would fly to Washington immediately.

It was all ridiculous, and very disheartening. Douglas Cater in his book, *The Fourth Branch of the Government*, about the relationship between the free press and the government, called the handling of this story a journalistic lapse that bordered on "complete irresponsibility."

Naturally, the person on whom this atomic flap took the most terrible toll was Charlie Ross. Inevitably, he felt responsible for his fellow newsmen's lapse. He thought he should have anticipated the question or asked Dad to clarify his remarks before the press conference ended. Charlie had been press secretary for more than five grueling years. "This job is like a prison," he wrote a friend on May 2, 1950. But he added, "The work remains, of course, extraordinarily interesting."

Charlie suffered from severe arthritis, and he also had a bad heart. He was at the top of Dr. Graham's worry list. After he wrote that letter, Charlie and the rest of the White House staff were plunged into the multiple crises of the Korean War. Then came the exhausting trip to Wake Island and the shock of the attempted assassination. Finally, on Monday, December 4, Prime Minister Attlee came hurtling into Washington for a summit conference which only increased the already impossible pressure—especially on Charlie.

The first day of my father's talks with the prime minister made it clear that Mr. Attlee's trip had been unnecessary. There were no real disagreements on any of the world problems they were facing together. But a very garbled account of the first day's

meeting was published in a London paper. Several reporters asked Charlie to give them a more factual briefing on what was really being said. The following day Charlie discussed this problem with Dad and got permission to tell the reporters everything that did not endanger our security. After lunch that day aboard the yacht *Williamsburg* with leaders of Congress, Dad and Mr. Attlee spent the afternoon discussing the problem of maintaining the Allied coalition in the United Nations, in the face of the new Chinese aggression. Charlie arrived back at the White House in the early evening and gave forty reporters a detailed account of the day's discussions. He did his usual masterful job. Then he was buttonholed by TV newsmen and asked to repeat some of the things he had said for their cameras. Charlie wearily agreed and sat down at his desk, while they set up a microphone on it. His secretary, Myrtle Bergheim, started kidding him, in the usual style of the Truman White House. "Don't mumble," she said.

"You know I always speak very distinctly," Charlie replied.

Suddenly, the cigarette he had just lit fell from his lips. He slumped back in his chair. Miss Bergheim immediately dialed Dr. Graham's number and he sprinted from his office in the main part of the White House. In less than a minute he was giving Charlie oxygen and administering a heart stimulant. But it was too late. "He was gone," Dr. Graham said, "before I got there."

Dad was shattered by the news. It seemed at the time like the last possible thing that could go wrong. He knew better than anyone how totally and unstintingly Charlie had given of himself in his job. Sadly, Dad sat down at his desk and wrote out in longhand a statement which is, I think, one of the most moving things he ever put down on paper.

The friend of my youth, who became a tower of strength when the responsibilities of high office so unexpectedly fell to me, is gone. To collect one's thoughts to pay tribute to Charles Ross in the face of this tragic dispensation is not easy. I knew him as a boy and as a man. In our high school years together he gave promise of these superb intellectual powers which he attained in after life. Teachers and students alike acclaimed him as the best all-around scholar our school had produced.

His years of preparation were followed by an early maturity of usefulness. In the many roles of life he played his part with

exalted honor and an honesty of purpose from which he never deviated. To him as a newspaperman truth was ever mighty as he pursued his work from Washington to the capitals of Europe to the far continents.

Here at the White House the scope of his influence extended far beyond his varied and complex and always exacting duties as secretary to the President. He was in charge of press and radio, a field which steadily broadened in recent years with continuous advance in the technique of communications. It was characteristic of Charlie Ross that he was holding a press conference when the summons came. We all knew that he was working far beyond his strength. But he would have it so. He fell at his post, a casualty of his fidelity to duty and his determination that our people should know the truth, and all the truth, in these critical times.

His exacting duties did not end with his work as press secretary. More and more, all of us came to depend on the counsel on questions of high public policy which he could give out of the wealth of his learning, his wisdom and his far-flung experience. Patriotism and integrity, honor and honesty, lofty ideals and nobility of intent were his guides and ordered his life from boyhood onward. He saw life steady and saw it whole. We shall miss him as a public servant and mourn him as a friend.

After the statement was typed, Dad walked down the short corridor to the lounge where the reporters were waiting. They formed a semicircle around him and he began to read the words, "The friend of my youth, who became a tower of—"

He could not go on. "Ah, hell," he said, and threw the typed words down on the table in front of the reporters. "I can't read this thing. You fellows know how I feel anyway."

His head bowed, Dad walked out of the room.

## [ CHAPTER ]

# Twenty-Six

I WANDERED into this vortex of grief and crisis. Five hours after Charlie Ross died, I gave the final concert of my 1950 tour at Constitution Hall. Although I was on a warm, first-name basis with all of Dad's aides, I was closest to Charlie. I treated him like an uncle and he treated me like a fresh niece. We were always exchanging wisecracks and friendly insults. From the perspective of his own grief, Dad had decided that I must not be told what had happened until the concert was over. This was easy enough to achieve. When the President of the United States gives an order, there are dozens of people ready to carry it out. It was far different from keeping the news of the attempted assassination from me. Then I was in a distant city, with only a handful of people to protect me from reporters. Dad's order was faithfully obeyed. I went onstage knowing nothing about Charlie's death.

But Dad could not control the reaction of the audience. Charlie Ross was one of the most popular men in Washington. News of his death had spread throughout the city. I was the only one in Constitution Hall who did not know about it. Coming on top of the bad news from Korea and the phony atomic bomb scare, Charlie's death may have made many people in the audience feel it was bad taste for me to be singing at all. At any rate, I soon sensed there was something wrong with their reaction. At the time I blamed it on Korea. I was sure it had nothing to do with the music. In fact, I thought it was one of my better performances.

1952-1953  
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As a result of the 1950 elections, the large Democratic majority in the House was cut drastically. In the Senate, the new alignment became 49 Democrats and 47 Republicans, with the Republicans picking up six seats, knocking out Senator Scott Lucas, the Majority Leader, and Senator Francis Myers, the Democratic Whip. In Ohio, Senator Taft won re-election by a whopping 400,000 majority and became the frontrunner for the Republican Presidential nomination in 1952.

Only a day after he wired Washington that the Chinese Reds had intervened on a full scale in Korea, MacArthur sent a revised opinion that this was not so. But, he added, "hostile planes are operating from bases west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea. . . . The present restrictions . . . provide a complete sanctuary for hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchuria-North Korea border. . . . Unless corrective measures are promptly taken this factor can assume decisive proportions."

Besides the right to "hot pursuit" of planes across the Yalu, MacArthur also requested permission "to execute the bombing of the targets under discussion as the only resource left to me to prevent a potential build-up of enemy strength to a point threatening the safety of the command."

In reply, Truman denied MacArthur the right to engage in "hot pursuit" of enemy planes and rejected his plea to bomb bases in Manchuria. As he saw it, such action would not only extend the war to China but would also cause the Russians to intervene as Red China's ally. World War III would then be unleashed upon the globe with all the new horrible weapons of war.

Despite Truman's restrictions, MacArthur began a renewed drive to reach the Yalu. On November 21, scattered units under his command arrived at the border. Three days later he sent Walker's Eighth Army on what was to be its final offensive. "If successful," he said, "this should for all practical purposes end the war, restore peace and unity to Korea . . . [and] enable the prompt withdrawal of United Nations military forces." There was also a report that MacArthur had told one of his commanders that "the boys will be home for Christmas," a report that the general later denied.

Then, on November 26, MacArthur's hope for a quick victory vanished. Across the wobbly planks of Yalu River bridges under cover of darkness, more than 200,000 Chinese Communist troops, well-

armed and trained, poured into North Korea. By the twenty-eighth, Walker's army was reeling under a massive, sustained assault; and on the east coast the X Corps found Chinese units both to the north and the south. With utter disregard for life, ignoring gunfire and heavy casualties, the Red Chinese soldiers swept forward in waves of frontal attacks. The X Corps soon lost contact with the Eighth Army, and the competition to reach the Yalu was now forgotten in a headlong retreat and a fight for survival. Bitterly MacArthur complained that the sole reason for this disaster was the order from Washington limiting the fighting to Korea. To reporters, he spoke about "extraordinary inhibitions . . . without precedent in military history."

"After the Chinese breakthrough," said Senator Connally, "the Republicans absolved MacArthur of all blame and loudly demanded Acheson's scalp for the blunder." At the same time, ill-feeling toward MacArthur ran high at the Pentagon. "It was well known in Washington that General Bradley disliked MacArthur," Senator Kilgore said. As for General Marshall, he and MacArthur had not been friends for decades.

While the Chinese Reds continued their savage advance, future military tactics in the Korean debacle became a matter of international concern because of Truman's news conference on November 30, 1950. Speaking to reporters, he remarked that "we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have."

"Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?" a reporter asked.

"There has always been active consideration of its use," Truman replied. "I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression."

Most newspapers omitted the words "always" in quoting Truman. The result was that his statement was given an entirely false interpretation. In England, a hundred Labor MP's signed a letter to Attlee protesting the possible use of the bomb, and a long and serious debate on Truman's supposed intention to use the bomb followed in the House of Commons. At the close of the debate, Attlee was loudly cheered when he announced that he was flying to Washington to discuss the use of the bomb with Truman.

By the time the Truman-Attlee talks got underway on December 4, Truman was in possession of a MacArthur note that read: "This

command . . . is now faced with conditions beyond its control and strength." Truman promptly pointed out to Attlee that although his advisers did not believe there was a chance to hold the line in Korea, he intended to make the attempt "until the situation improves the chances for negotiation." If the Chinese took Korea, he added, they would next move into Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya. The Soviet Union was the true aggressor, the two agreed, and would benefit most if Truman listened to MacArthur and extended the war to China proper. As General Bradley later expressed it, such a conflict would involve the United States "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy."

On the fifth, Truman and Attlee, with their advisers, met again on the *Williamsburg* for lunch and further discussion. This was one of Truman's worst days. Afterward, Charlie Ross returned to his office in the White House, where he suffered a heart attack at his desk and died.

Truman was stunned. But he had no opportunity to retire alone with his grief, for that very evening Margaret was giving a concert at Constitution Hall. Concerned that Ross's death would affect her singing, he implored his aides not to inform her. That evening, Margaret said, when she walked onto the stage, "the atmosphere was charged not only with grief but with mystery. I think I should have been told that my friend had died."

The concert went smoothly enough, but its aftermath produced a furor because of a letter Truman wrote to the music critic of the *Washington Post* while under great emotional stress. The statements in Paul Hume's review of Margaret's concert that most infuriated Truman were: "She is flat a good deal of the time. . . . She cannot sing with anything approaching professional finish. . . . She communicates almost nothing of the music she presents."

After Truman read the review early the next morning, he did not wait to reach his office to write a denunciatory letter. Without breakfast, mourning the loss only thirteen hours earlier of Charlie Ross, and with both Clement Attlee and a military catastrophe on his hands, he dashed off a wrathful note in longhand on a White House memo pad. The collector's item Hume received read:

I have just read your lousy review buried in the back pages. You sound like a frustrated man that never made a success, an eight-ulcer man on a four-ulcer job, and all four ulcers working.

I never met you, but if I do you'll need a new nose and plenty of beefsteak and perhaps a supporter below. Westbrook Pegler, a gutter-snipe, is a gentleman compared to you. You can take that as more of an insult than a reflection on your ancestry.

The letter was widely publicized and editorial after editorial denounced Truman's lack of decorum. When Margaret was first told about the letter, she said angrily, "I am absolutely positive my father wouldn't use language like that." But later, when she learned that he really had written it, she added, "I appreciated my father's insistence on being a human being first, and the Devil take the hindmost."

There were other letters during that period of grave concern over the course of fighting in Korea. When Colorado State Senator N. Bishop wrote to him proposing that John L. Lewis be named ambassador to the Soviet Union, Truman replied that he would not appoint Lewis dog catcher. Then on December 7, before the publication of the diplomatically worded communiqué on his meetings with Attlee, he wrote a blistering reply to Representative Edward Hebert of Louisiana, who had proposed that he ask the churches to set aside a day of prayer "to appeal to Almighty God for guidance and wisdom": "I am extremely sorry that the sentiments expressed in your letter were not thought of before November 7, when the campaign in your state, Utah, North Carolina, Illinois and Indiana was carried on in a manner that was as low as I've ever seen and I've been in this game since 1906."

As the grim days of December dragged by, the news from Korea continued bad. Pyongyang fell to the Chinese Reds. By January 4, 1951, Seoul was also in their hands, and MacArthur regrouped his armies at new positions running about 70 miles below the 38th Parallel. For a time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Truman that there was a probability of a re-enactment of the Pusan beachhead stand of the previous August-September and perhaps a general retreat to Japan. But by the end of January, MacArthur's forces slowly began a forward movement. General Walker had been killed in a jeep accident, and General Matthew B. Ridgway, who replaced him as commander of the Eighth Army, did yeoman work in putting his army on the offensive again. The X Corps had been successfully evacuated from the northeast sector at Hungnam in North Korea and was ready for further action. In March, MacArthur's men were back at the 38th Parallel.

officer Lt. Colonel R. L. Thompson that there would be no ban on "fair and honest criticism," his earlier order that "criticism of command decisions or of the conduct of Allied soldiers on the battlefield will not be tolerated" raised doubts in the minds of reporters. Thompson's revision of the statement to add the qualifying word "unwarranted" was also un reassuring in light of his explanation that the army would be the "sole judge and jury on whether criticism is unwarranted or not." Colonel Echols reiterated his request for compliance with the voluntary censorship code as a substitute for formal press controls. Echols charged that interviews with wounded or shell-shocked soldiers demoralized and frightened "[Korean] men who might otherwise fight on the democratic side." Correspondent Ray Erwin reported that two newsmen sent to Japan for "reorientation" had apparently broken the voluntary censorship code that forbade mentioning unit affiliation, specific locations, and troop movements.<sup>33</sup>

The censorship issue became linked to the White House in late August when President Truman countermanded a call by General MacArthur for use of Chinese nationalist troops in Korea. In this well-known controversy MacArthur had advanced his proposal in a speech prepared for delivery at the Veterans of Foreign Wars annual encampment. Truman, fearful that deployment of Chinese nationalist troops could bring Communist China and the Soviet Union into the fighting and thus precipitate a third world war, ordered the speech withdrawn. MacArthur's original address nevertheless was published in the press and in the *Congressional Record*. *Editor and Publisher* reported that news correspondents looked for "censorship at the source" to increase in the wake of the president's displeasure over recent public utterances on military and diplomatic policy.<sup>34</sup>

Fundamental policy differences between the president and the general, seemingly resolved in their well-publicized meeting at Wake Island in mid-October, took on a larger significance after a massive Chinese intervention had sent MacArthur's troops reeling backward from advanced positions in North Korea. The urgency MacArthur attached to expanding the war to China itself through the use of American air and sea power with the support of nationalist Chinese forces became a common topic of conversation in Washington.<sup>35</sup>

33. *Editor and Publisher* (July 8, 1950): 7; (August 5, 1950): 9.

34. *Editor and Publisher* (August 5, 1950): 9.

35. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman*, 244–45, 261.

Truman took note of the reports about his and MacArthur's divergent views in a press conference November 30. With a sharpness that increasingly characterized his meetings with reporters, Truman rebuked the correspondents for suggesting that the general had exceeded his authority. Stunned by Truman's comment that MacArthur had done "nothing of the kind," the reporters remained silent.

"Well," Truman asked, "what is the matter?"

The reporters retraced the differences between the two men as evidence of the general's insubordination.<sup>36</sup>

The contentious press conference took an even more unexpected turn when a reporter asked Truman a follow-up question to the president's remark that "we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have."

"Will that include the atomic bomb?" the reporter asked.

"That includes every weapon we have," the president replied. The ensuing questions led Truman to make a number of provocative statements, including his explanation that "the military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapon, as he always has."<sup>37</sup>

In the closing moments of the conference, Truman angrily lashed out at reporters for stories he characterized as "attacks and speculations and lies that have been told on the members of this Government." He added, "I am getting tired of all this foolishness, and I'm going to 'bust loose' on you one of these days."<sup>38</sup>

While the reporters laughed at Truman's parting shot, Press Secretary Ross acted quickly to defuse Truman's explosive comments on the use of the atomic bomb. In a press release that afternoon, Ross put the best face on the president's remarks. The release confirmed that "Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject [the use of the atomic bomb] since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat." The statement offered further explanation:

Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon. However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If

36. *Public Papers*, 1950, 725–26.

37. *Ibid.*, 727.

38. *Ibid.*, 728.

and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

The release concluded: "In brief, the replies to the question at today's press conference do not represent any change in this situation."<sup>39</sup>

While Truman's remarks on the possible use of the atomic bomb provoked banner headlines in the world press and brought British Prime Minister Clement Attlee scurrying to Washington for consultation, the communiqué released at the end of the prime minister's meeting with the president did not change the explanation provided by Truman in his press conference and the clarifying statement issued by Secretary Ross.<sup>40</sup>

Sadly, Charles Ross's handling of the uproar over the president's exchange with reporters on the possible use of atomic bombs in the Korean conflict was his final act. As the sixty-five-year-old press secretary prepared to give Frank Bourgholtzer of NBC a recorded account of the Truman-Attlee meeting for broadcast, he slumped to his desk, dying instantly of a heart attack. His death on December 5 removed from Truman's inner circle a close friend and valuable adviser, as well as a loyal and hard-working press secretary.<sup>41</sup>

Respectful coverage of Ross's death and his service as the president's spokesman filled the front pages and editorial sections of the nation's newspapers for the next few days,<sup>42</sup> providing a break in the tension-laden exchanges between Truman and reporters. Of all the journalistic tributes to Ross, the *Wall Street Journal* most perceptively noted that two loyalties had commanded the president's press secretary:

One was to his old friend, schoolmate and President. The other was to the business of telling the public what goes on in the world and, if possible, why. Sometimes the two inevitably conflicted, and the remarkable thing is that no one ever questioned his loyalty to the other.

For that, Harry Truman is deeply in Charlie Ross's debt. And the rest of us are, too.<sup>43</sup>

39. *Ibid.*, note 3, 727.

40. Farrar, *Reluctant Servant*, 220-21.

41. *Ibid.*, 225-26.

42. *Ibid.*, 227-29.

43. Quoted in Farrar, *Reluctant Servant*, 228.

Truman penned his own tribute to Ross, echoing many of the journalistic salutes to an outstanding member of the guild. He found the larger contribution of Ross to his presidency in his lifelong friend's counsel on questions of "high public policy which he could give out of the wealth of his learning, his wisdom and his far-flung experience. Patriotism and integrity, honor and honesty, lofty ideals and nobility of intent were his guides and ordered his life from boyhood onward."

The president, meeting with reporters in the press room where Ross had conducted twice-daily news briefings for more than five years, started to read his tribute. But his voice broke before he could complete the first sentence. A long period of silence followed until Truman regained his composure; still he could not complete his statement.

"Aw, hell! I can't read this thing. You fellows know how I feel, anyway."

He laid the text on a table, and he left the room, tears streaming down his face.<sup>44</sup>

The following month the matter of presidential authority to send troops to Europe and a rehash of the potential use of atomic weapons in the Korean War resurfaced at the president's news conference. Truman, prepared for a question on his authority to send troops abroad, read from a statement that cited his constitutional power as commander in chief of the armed forces to send troops anywhere in the world. That power, he added, had been recognized repeatedly by the Congress and the courts. For the next several minutes reporters asked questions to elucidate the matter, specifically on whether he would consult with Congress before sending more troops to Europe. The fury of questions on when and under what circumstances the president would consult with Congress produced as much confusion as clarity, but the stories published from the exchange reported that Truman said that he would consult with Congress on the matter.<sup>45</sup>

The subject came up again at the news conference of January 18 as reporters engaged Truman in semantics over his constitutional authority and the need to consult Congress on the sending of troops abroad. Probably feeling badgered by the line of questioning at two previous news conferences and perhaps confused himself by now on

44. *Ibid.*, 229-31. The tribute is printed in *Public Papers*, 1950, 737.

45. *Public Papers*, 1951, 4, 18-23.

Franklin D. Mitchell

U. of Missouri Press.

Columbia 1998.

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44. *Ibid.*, 229-31. The tribute is printed in *Public Papers*, 1950, 737.

45. *Public Papers*, 1951, 4, 18-23.

what had been reported in the press, Truman blamed the reporters for the confusion:

You know, it's a peculiar situation, sometimes, that arises here. Last week, I made it perfectly plain exactly what I would do with the legislative branch . . . and the statement that I made about consultation [with the Congress] was not quoted in a single paper in the United States. . . . At the same time, two or three weeks ago, there was a question came up here about atomic energy and its use for national defense. It was rather badly garbled and created an argument that was entirely unnecessary.

He would appreciate it, Truman said, if the reporters would state the facts "as I state them to you."<sup>46</sup>

The correspondents quickly challenged Truman on his command of the facts. They had indeed reported that he planned to consult with Congress and their editors had printed the story accurately. The exchange ended in a standoff, with Truman insisting that the reporters would understand his point by reading the news conference transcript. The reporters stuck by their guns, and properly so. What about the comment on the atomic bomb, one reporter asked? Read the *New Yorker*, Truman advised, a reference to writer John Hersey's recent article that used "an exact and complete transcript of what was said and what was meant."<sup>47</sup>

In fact, Hersey's article, written with the cooperation of the White House Press Office, provided an account of the controversy over the possible use of the atomic bomb along the same lines expressed in the press secretary's news release. Robert Brown suggested in his weekly column in *Editor and Publisher* that Truman had purposely created a row with the press as a means of taking some of the heat off him in the Senate debate over presidential authority. "It is known that President Truman and others before him," Brown contended, "have been clever enough to use an occasional blast at the press as a smoke screen for some other more dangerous or ticklish subject that might arise at the press conference." Truman's criticism of the press for its treatment of his remarks on the atomic bomb, Brown averred, was an attempt to "get off the hook" even at this late date.<sup>48</sup>

46. *Ibid.*, 112-14.

47. *Ibid.*, 113-14.

48. John Hersey, *Aspects of the Presidency*, 3-8, 59-66; Robert U. Brown, "Shop Talk at Thirty," *Editor and Publisher* (January 27, 1951): 64.

Years later *New York Herald Tribune* reporter Robert Donovan returned to this controversy in his history of the Truman administration. Donovan suspected that Truman had deliberately manipulated reporters on the possible use of tactical atomic bombs in the Korean War, ostensibly as a stratagem of war. But finding no evidence in Truman's papers to support this suspicion, he concluded that the remarks on the subject should be regarded as an "unwise provocation by the president." However, in light of the use of atomic diplomacy employed by the Eisenhower administration to obtain an armistice in Korea in July 1953, some value may have attached to Truman's words, intended or not.<sup>49</sup>

Significantly, Truman had both practical and moral grounds for not using atomic weapons in Korea. Subsequently declassified papers revealed that the president feared that an unexploded warhead could fall into the enemy's hands and be used to its advantage. He had stated the moral reason for not using atomic weapons in his November 30 press conference when the subject first arose. He told reporters, "It is a terrible weapon. And it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used."<sup>50</sup>

Still, the administration went forward with a multibillion-dollar request for nuclear and conventional weapons appropriations from Congress on the day following his controversial remarks. The president's request—the front-page story of the *New York Times* and other newspapers for December 2, 1950—asked that Congress supply slightly more than a billion dollars in a total defense request of \$16.5 billion to expand the nation's existing stockpile of atomic weapons.<sup>51</sup>

49. Donovan's quote is in Thompson, ed., *Ten Presidents and the Press*, 41-44; see Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller, and Stephen Van Evera, *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*, 114-55.

50. A newspaper account of the technical security reasons for not using atomic weapons in Korea was published in the *New York Post*, December 31, 1950. See "HST File, Atom Policy," Box 12, Democratic National Committee Clipping File, Truman Library. In 1977 documents of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made public the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered recommending the use of atomic bombs during the Korean War but did not find any strategic targets worthwhile. *Los Angeles Times*, March 7, 1977. *Public Papers*, 1950, 727; 1952-1953, 1200-1201. Truman expanded upon his point about using nuclear weapons in his farewell address.

51. *New York Times*, December 2, 1950.

the privacy of his diary, was already struggling with before the rest of the world had even heard of the atomic bomb.

#### The contemplated uses of atomic weapons

One final question merits attention in this brief exploration of the interwoven responses of the American people and their president to the atomic bomb. What postwar diplomatic and military uses, if any, were envisaged for what Bernard Baruch in 1946 called America's "winning weapon"? On this critical question, too, Truman vacillated in ways that reflected the larger uncertainty of the American people. In his post-Hiroshima public pronouncements, Truman always insisted that a fundamental objective of U.S. policy was to devise a system of international control that would end the U.S. atomic supremacy, forestall a dangerous nuclear arms race, and ensure that the bomb would never again be used. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan of March 1946, to which historians have given much attention, was presented to the world as an expression of this high-minded objective.

At the same time, Truman was clearly prepared to gain whatever strategic advantage he could from the U.S. atomic monopoly that continued until September 1949 and the overwhelming U.S. atomic superiority that lasted considerably longer. As he wrote jauntily to Bess from Potsdam on 31 July 1945, using a metaphor drawn from his favorite game: "I rather think Mr. Stalin is stallin' because he is not so happy over the English elections. [Clement Attlee had replaced Winston Churchill as prime minister.] He doesn't know it but I have an ace in the hole and another one showing—so unless he has threes or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right."<sup>51</sup> As numerous studies have now demonstrated, all Truman's thinking and decision making regarding nuclear weapons from July 1945 through the end of his term invariably reflected his preoccupation with the U.S.-Soviet power nexus.

As the cold war worsened, did Truman ever envisage the atomic bomb not only as a diplomatic asset in his maneuverings with the Soviets but as something that actually might be used again? In various public pronouncements, as well as in occasional private communications within the government, Truman firmly rejected such an option. Thus when Army Secretary Kenneth Royall urged a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviets during the 1948 Berlin blockade crisis, Truman made plain that

<sup>51</sup> Harry Truman to Bess Truman, 31 July 1945, in Ferrell, ed., "Dear Bess," 522.

he considered such an action not only unthinkable morally but appalling in its strategic and diplomatic short-sightedness: "You have got to understand that this isn't a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. You have got to understand that I have got to think about the effect of such a thing on international relations. This is no time to be juggling an atom bomb around."<sup>52</sup>

When the cold war turned hot in Korea, however, Truman himself toyed with the nuclear option. At a news conference on 30 November 1950, after the Chinese invasion across the Yalu River, Truman was asked about the possible use of the atomic bomb. He replied: "There has always been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression." When the respected Merriman Smith of the United Press asked the president explicitly to confirm whether dropping the atomic bomb was, indeed, under "active consideration," he answered tersely: "Always has been. It is one of our weapons." When asked whether the targets being considered were civilian or military, he responded that this was a "matter that the military people have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things. . . . The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has."<sup>53</sup>

The newspapers reported the story in banner headlines. A United Press bulletin proclaimed: "PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR IN KOREA." An alarmed Prime Minister Attlee flew to Washington to dissuade the president from precipitate action.<sup>54</sup>

In her biography of her father, Margaret Truman describes this episode as "all ridiculous, and very disheartening." It was, she writes, a classic example of journalistic distortion and sensationalism. Indeed, she implicitly blames the press's handling of this story for the fatal heart attack suffered a few days later by Truman's old friend and press secre-

<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 260. Compare this statement with the one from Truman's memoirs, quoted earlier, justifying the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: "I regarded the bomb as a military weapon, and never had any doubt that it should be used."

<sup>53</sup> Truman news conference, 30 November 1950, quoted in Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: William Morrow, 1973), 495-96.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 497.

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tary Charlie Ross.<sup>55</sup> Yet when one reads Truman's clear answers to a series of clear questions, it is difficult to see how the reporters distorted or misrepresented his views. Truman's comments seemed clearly to indicate that use of the atomic bomb in the Korean War, while deeply deplorable, was indeed under active consideration and that targeting decisions would be left to "the military commander in the field"—General Douglas MacArthur, well known for his advocacy of turning the Korean conflict into a war of destruction against communist China.

In 1952, with his popularity sagging at home and the armistice talks bogged down at Panmunjom, Truman again considered the nuclear option, this time in the form of two memorandums evidently written to clarify his own thinking and spelling out in specific detail a nuclear ultimatum to the Soviets. The first, dated 27 January 1952, says:

It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indochina, and that we intend to destroy every military base in Manchuria by means now in our control—and if there is further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our purposes.

This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated.<sup>56</sup>

In the second of these two remarkable memos, this one written in May 1952, Truman actually drafted his ultimatum to "the Commies": "Now do you want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed? You may have one or the other; whichever you want, these lies of yours at this conference have gone far enough. You either accept our fair and just proposal or you will be completely destroyed."<sup>57</sup>

It is important to place these documents in context. Apart from the 1950 news conference mentioned above, Truman in his public pronouncements dismissed all talk of employing atomic weapons in the Korean War. Indeed, he had recalled General MacArthur in April 1951 in part over MacArthur's insistent calls for a wider war. And the Truman administration had firmly rejected NSC 100, the 1951 proposal by Stuart Symington, chairman of the National Security Resources Board, to the National Security Council calling for a nuclear attack on China and pos-

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 498–99.

<sup>56</sup> Quoted in "Truman Considered All-out War in 1952," *New York Times*, 3 August 1980, 20.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

sibly the Soviet Union. In this context, Gregg Herken is probably correct in suggesting that Truman's Rambo-like private musings are best seen as "more an expression of pique than of policy."<sup>58</sup> Yet in a nuclear age, even such "pique" by a U.S. president cannot be dismissed lightly.

Clearly, Truman's view of the military and diplomatic utility of the atomic bomb was ambivalent. He could readily state the compelling arguments against using the bomb (except when looking back on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and he recognized the terrible dangers of nuclear threats and bluster. Yet when his frustration level rose high enough—whether against Stalin at Potsdam or the communists in Korea—his thinking invariably circled back to the alluring option of resolving his frustrations once and for all with his ace in the hole.

In this respect, too, Truman's ambivalence mirrored to a striking degree the ambivalence of the American public: fearful of the bomb, aware of the horror of nuclear war, yet longing to translate the nation's atomic supremacy into a decisive stroke against the new postwar enemy. Here it is important to note that, at least for some Americans, Truman's ringing defense of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan had larger implications. If the bomb was justified against one enemy, they plausibly asked, why not against another? As one reader wrote the *New Yorker* after the publication of John Hersey's *Hiroshima* in August 1946, "I read Hersey's report. It was marvelous. Now let us drop a handful on Moscow." A letter published in the *New York Daily News* at about the same time drew the same linkage: "Russia shows by its spy activities in Canada that it badly wants the atom bomb, so I say give the bomb to Russia the same way we gave it to the Japs."<sup>59</sup>

During the Korean War, a strong current of opinion emerged in favor of using the atomic bomb. In August 1950, a few weeks after the war began, 28 percent of Americans favored this option. When the Chinese entered the war in November, *U.S. News and World Report* noted a "wave of demand" for an atomic response. By November 1951, with the war in a costly, frustrating stalemate, 51 percent of Americans supported dropping atomic bombs on "military targets."<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> Herken, *Winning Weapon*, 334.

<sup>59</sup> John Gunther, *Inside USA* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 544 (*New York Daily News* quoted); Joseph Lutt and W. M. Wheeler, "Reaction to John Hersey's 'Hiroshima,'" *Journal of Social Psychology* 28 (August 1948): 138.

<sup>60</sup> *Gallup Poll*, II, 938, 1027 (in the November poll, 41 percent of those questioned favored the atomic bombing of military targets without qualification; 10 percent qualified their answer in various ways); "A-Bomb Will Not Beat China: Crowded Military Targets Scarce in Far East," *U.S. News and World Report*, 8 December 1950, 23.

Although some periodicals like the *Saturday Evening Post* warned that use of the atomic bomb in Korea would surely trigger World War III, others discussed the matter quite coolly, as a viable option to be carefully weighed. *Science News Letter* concluded that North Korea's urban-industrial centers were so few as probably not to "warrant" using the atomic bomb on them. After an assessment of the tactical pros and cons that ignored any larger strategic (not to mention ethical) considerations, *U.S. News and World Report* concluded in December 1950 that U.S. use of the bomb in Korea would probably be "sparing."<sup>61</sup>

On a different cultural front, composer Fred Kirby's 1950 country tune "When the Hell Bomb Falls" mingled images of nuclear destruction with the wish that God would "lend a helping hand" in Korea. In Roy Acuff's "Advice to Joe" (1951) the wish becomes explicit, as Acuff warns the Russians that when Moscow lies in ashes they will regret their aggressions. "When the atomic bombs start falling," the song rhetorically asks Stalin, "do you have a place to hide?"<sup>62</sup>

The American people and their president displayed strikingly parallel patterns of response in their risky flirtation with the atomic bomb during the Korean War. This was only the latest manifestation of a congruence of outlook that had been evident for years. From the time he learned of the Alamogordo test in July 1945, Truman's attitude toward the atomic bomb was a bundle of contradictions. He could express awe, fear, caution, bluster, or bravado, depending on his mood, his audience, and the circumstances of the moment. The very diversity and unpredictability of these reactions accurately mirrored the mood of the nation as a whole. Reacting to their political leaders, to the media, and to their own instincts, the American people displayed a wide and sometimes quite contradictory range of responses as they struggled to come to terms with the endless, ramifying implications of the news they first heard from President Truman on 6 August 1945.

Epilogue: January 1953

Truman's final and most complete comment on the atomic dilemma as president came in his state-of-the-union message of 7 January 1953, nine

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. "No Worthwhile Target for A-Bomb in North Korea," *Science Newsletter*, 22 July 1950, 50.

<sup>62</sup> Wolfe, "Nuclear Country," 19.

weeks after the United States exploded the world's first hydrogen bomb at Eniwetok Atoll in the South Pacific. It was an exceptionally depressing appraisal:

Now we have entered the atomic age, and war has undergone a technological change which makes it a very different thing from what it used to be. War today between the Soviet Empire and the free nations might dig the grave not only of our Stalinist opponents but of our own society, our world as well as theirs.

War's new meaning may not yet be grasped by all the peoples who would be its victims; nor, perhaps by all the rulers of the Kremlin. . . . The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past—and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.

Such a war is not a possible policy for rational man. We know this, but we dare not assume that others would not yield to the temptation science is now placing in their hands.<sup>63</sup>

Truman went on to insist that the United States had done everything in its power to avoid a nuclear arms race; the fault lay entirely with the Soviet Union. But beneath the cold-war rhetoric lay another theme: the inevitability of an upward spiral of nuclear menace rooted in the nature of science itself. "Science and technology have worked so fast," Truman suggested, that mere presidents and premiers were helpless in the face of its inexorable advance:

The progress of scientific experiment has outrun our expectations. Atomic science is in the full tide of development; the unfolding of the innermost secrets of matter is uninterrupted and irresistible. Since Alamogordo we have developed atomic weapons with many times the explosive force of the early models, and we have produced them in substantial quantities. And recently in the thermonuclear tests at Eniwetok, we have entered another stage in the world-shaking development of atomic energy. From now on man moves in a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of an order of magnitude dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

We have no reason to think that the stage we have now reached in the release of atomic energy will be the last. Indeed, the speed of our scientific and technical progress over the last 7 years shows no sign of abating. We are being hurried forward in our mastery of the atom, from one discovery to another, toward yet unforeseeable peaks of destructive energy. . . . It is no wonder that some people wish that we had never succeeded in splitting the atom.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> State of the Union Message, 7 January 1953, in Israel, ed., *State of the Union Messages of the Presidents*, 3006–07.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

1945  
1950  
bomb

changed his mind again and decided there must be an approach to Russia if a catastrophe was to be avoided. One month after Hiroshima, he took to the White House a memorandum in which he made the momentous proposal for three-power control of the bomb. He argued that the attempt "to maintain an Anglo-Saxon bloc" against the Soviet Union would lead to "a secret armament race of a rather desperate character."

An inconclusive and somewhat acerbic discussion took place at the special Cabinet meeting called to consider the proposal, and that was the last anyone heard of it until it was transmogrified into the Baruch Plan and unveiled at the UN. The tide was already running heavily in an opposite direction so that those who had doubts or reservations or simple amendments were swept along with the all-outers and intransigents. Byrnes told McCloy he was against any negotiations looking to international control of atomic energy. General Groves was instructed to move full speed ahead with the manufacture of atomic bombs. We were the only ones who had the secret and we were going to make the world dance to our tune and like it. Call it the American Century, or Pax Americana, or that we had come of age and were ready to assume our world responsibilities—what came out at the policy end of the funnel was the same. Truman told a visitor "that the Russians would soon be put in their places; and that the United States would then take the lead in running the world in the way that the world ought to be run." The scientists had been saying that Russia would cover the ground we had traveled within a matter of five years, but the politicians would have none of it. They decided on evidence best known to themselves that it might be as many as twenty years before the American monopoly was broken. (When the Russians exploded their atomic bomb four years later, Truman informed the American public—but he did not really believe it.\*)

At the same jamboree in early October, 1945, where he charmed the Methodist ladies with a rendition of Paderewski's *Minuet*, the correspondents were invited for a press conference to the lodge on Reelfoot Lake in Tennessee, just across the state line from Missouri, where

\* Admiral Robert Lee Dennison met with him in 1949 to advocate work on a hydrogen bomb. As an argument for his proposal, he pointed to the Russians' success with the atom bomb as proof of their capabilities. Truman told him he agreed with his proposal, whereupon Dennison and his colleagues gathered up their papers and started to leave. As they reached the door the President gave them the parting shot, "But I still don't believe it."

the President was relaxing. The reporters resembled some of the Cabinet members who had participated in the consideration of Stimson's memorandum. All they could focus on was: Were we going to give our "secret" to the Russians or anybody else, or were we going to hug the "secret" to our own bosoms? In answer to a question, Truman explained, "The scientific knowledge that resulted in the atomic bomb is already worldwide knowledge. It is only the know-how of putting that knowledge practically to work that is our secret." When the reporter wanted to know, "Would it apply to letting them in on the know-how?" Truman told him, "Well, I don't think it would do any good to let them in on the know-how, because I don't think they could do it, anyway. You would have to have the industrial plant and our engineering ability to do the job." On this matter Truman was the incarnation of the dominant American spirit in the high noon of its vainglory. Others may be great with theory. But we're the only folks who know how to put it to work. We have come up with a product no one else has got. Now the smart thing to do is to cash in on our advantage. Nor was the reaction uniquely American, Midwestern, or Missourian. The British aristocrats and laborites displayed equal smugness, all the more pitiable since they were cavorting at somebody else's wedding. To repeat the platitude of our times, the atom was split before mankind was ready for it. It was appropriate that Truman should make his pronouncement on this world-shaking question in the setting of a rustic lodge, surrounded by his good-time cronies, with his remarks interrupted by an exuberant follower at the other end of the porch bellowing, until he was quieted, "Tennessee for Truman." Nothing had daunted us in our history up to now, and there was no reason why an atom bomb should make us change our habits.

The British (and Canadians) had worked with us on the Manhattan Project, and under the Roosevelt-Churchill understanding reached at Quebec in August, 1943, a combined policy committee, consisting of three Americans and three Britons, had been set up for a free interchange of information. Upon reading of the President's press interview blazoned in headlines: TRUMAN SAYS U.S. TO KEEP ATOMIC BOMB SECRET, the British were perturbed and pressed for an early meeting. Before Truman met with Attlee and Mackenzie King in early November, the State Department sent him a paper arguing that the exchange of information had referred to scientific research and development, but that "information concerning manufacturing know-how" applied only to bringing the wartime project to "speedy fruition."

H T  
over the wire  
Provisions

Truman wrote in his *Memoirs* that he was also of the opinion that "the nature of the partnership had to be readjusted." What he did, though, was to initial at the conclusion of the conference a memorandum drawn up by Vannevar Bush, the Director of Scientific Research, to continue the wartime cooperation between the three nations. Groves, on Truman's instruction, made an agreement to provide the British with help for the construction of their own plant.\* Attlee and King then accepted the American proposition of dumping the matter of international control into the United Nations (which Stimson had warned against if an agreement with the Soviets was really desired). They instructed the still-uncreated UN Commission that the plan it offered would have to "proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken"—all of which was incorporated in the Truman-Attlee-King declaration.

Byrnes was to leave for Moscow at the end of the year. He was given an interdepartmental memorandum in line with the three-power declaration; this he intended to use to secure the Russians' agreement for the creation of a UN commission to consider international control. That was when his trouble with Truman and others really started. The atomic fever was rising all along the Potomac. Generals, admirals, congressmen, Cabinet members, were working themselves to a pitch. General Groves, upon learning of the memorandum, protested vigorously. Although no one could claim better Cold War credentials than Byrnes, Forrestal joined forces with Groves. Senators Connally and Vandenberg were equally agitated lest Byrnes give away secrets in order to induce the Russians to participate in the work of a UN atomic energy commission. When Byrnes read to a senatorial group a draft of the proposal he intended to make in Moscow, Vandenberg said they were all shocked. "We are opposed to giving any of the atomic secrets away unless and until the Soviets are prepared to be 'policed' by UNO in respect to their prohibition. We consider an 'exchange' of scientists and scientific information as sheer appeasement because Russia had nothing to 'exchange.'" Since Byrnes refused to take their

\* When after several months the Americans did not carry out their pledges, British representatives met with Acheson, who told them "it was quite impossible to fulfill the obligation of the arrangement. If a secret arrangement were carried out, it would blow the administration out of the water. They must just resign themselves to the fact that although we made the agreement, we simply could not carry it out; that things like that happen in the government of the U.S. due to the loose way things are handled."

fears seriously, the delegation arranged to meet with the President the following morning. The senators were shocked all over again after Truman read to them his directive to Byrnes, which listed the consecutive steps that Byrnes had read off the day before. Although Vandenberg made it clear that the directive would make it possible for Byrnes "to prematurely give away, while in Moscow, at least half of all our 'trading stock' when we seek essential controls," the President "for some inscrutable reason" failed to grasp his point. Vandenberg went into his Indian war dance again when he read the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Moscow Conference containing the same innocuous homily that for him had a sinister connotation.

On January 16 of the new year, Lilienthal made the following entry in his journal:

Saw Acheson. He talked frankly and in detail: Those charged with foreign policy—the Secretary of State and the President—did not have either the facts or an understanding of what was involved in the atomic energy issue, the most serious cloud hanging over the world. Commitments, on paper and in communiqués, have been made and are being made without a knowledge of what the hell it is all about—literally! The War Department, and really one man in the War Department, General Groves, has by the power of the veto on the ground of "military security" really been determining and almost running foreign policy. He had entered into contracts involving other countries (Belgium and their Congo deposits of uranium, for example) without even the knowledge of the Department of State. Finally realizing that this could not go on, Acheson was able to persuade the President and Secretary to do something about it. [Byrnes appointed a committee, headed by Acheson, to work out the American position for our UN representative, and Acheson, in turn, got Lilienthal to head an advisory panel to canvass the field.]

Out of the mill came the recommendations known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, in the main the work of J. Robert Oppenheimer, former director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and often referred to as the father of the atom bomb. It was a bold and far-reaching plan; indeed, a revolutionary one. An international agency was to take over ownership or the lease of all mines containing atomic materials, all

ervoir area, the badly mauled X Corps had to be evacuated from Hungnam by a fleet of over a hundred ships. The campaign was over, the greatest defeat suffered by American arms since the Battle of Manassas.

Despite later intimations to the contrary, up to this time MacArthur had followed administration policy in the main. His manner had been insufferable, his contempt for the President and his associates ill-concealed, his rejection of tactical suggestions haughty—and he had been guilty of a number of provocations. But the decision to conquer North Korea had been the administration's, and so was the decision to send the fleet to Formosan waters and to resume aid to the Nationalists. Having only South Korean troops occupy the immediate zone adjoining the Manchurian and Russian borders, and the suggestion of the British and others to establish a shallow demilitarized zone in the north were distinctly second-rate questions preoccupying worried UN delegates who wanted to hunt with the hounds but avoid the risks of the chase. It was clear that the Chinese were concerned about the military presence of a hostile superpower on their borders. Deploying only South Koreans in the immediate zone or the creation of a shallow demilitarized zone while American forces were in command of the entire area would not have altered the basic military equation. The decision that counted was whether to cross the 38th parallel to wipe out the North Korean regime, or not to cross and retain the prewar demarcation and division. Once the decision for forcible unification was made, tactical variations left unaffected the substance of the risk. The later insinuation that the decision had been based on MacArthur's false advice at Wake was equally self-serving. Truman, Acheson, Marshall, the Joint Chiefs, knew the Chinese had armies massed behind the Yalu. Whether the Chinese would choose to use them was a political estimation for which they were not dependent on MacArthur. Though his omniscient pose was afterward an embarrassment to him, they had made their decision independently before the Wake conference. They suffered from the same malady that he did. "They [the Chinese] really fooled us when it comes right down to it, didn't they?" Senator Leverett Saltonstall asked Acheson. "Yes, sir," the Secretary acknowledged. Where MacArthur was vulnerable to criticism was in his special domain of expertise: in separating the Eighth Army from the X Corps with a huge gap of trackless mountain terrain open between the two forces and the flanks of both exposed, and in rushing ahead so recklessly after he knew that Chinese forces were in the battle area. Excessive self-confidence had

grown into blundering foolhardiness when he permitted his technically superior army to be trapped into fighting on the enemy's ground and on the enemy's terms.

Now his raging ego dictated his further conduct. He was under the double compulsion of rewriting recent history and transferring the blame for the disaster onto other shoulders. His occasional pinpricks and provocations he now integrated into a systematic campaign to overturn administration policy, his scattered policy differences, he now built up into a counterposition. Press statements gushed from the Tokyo headquarters as water from an overlaid mountain stream. The orders forbidding him to strike across the Manchurian border put his forces under "an enormous handicap unprecedented in military history." He told the Joint Chiefs that he was opposed to a defensive strategy, that "unless some positive and immediate action" was taken, "steady attrition leading to final destruction" was in the offing. Truman's patience wore thin. He ordered all military commanders to halt direct communication with publicity media on military or foreign affairs, and sent General Lawton Collins to the Far East to find out what was going on.

Truman himself added to the panic of that week with a rash utterance to the press that use of the atom bomb was under active consideration. His statement followed two earlier sensations. In August, Navy Secretary Francis Matthews had called for preventive war, thought by newspapermen to be a trial balloon of a cabal that included Defense Secretary Louis Johnson. This was followed by the announcement of General Orville Anderson, commandant of the Air War College, that the Air Force was ready and willing to bomb Moscow. Truman's statement set off a nervous debate in the British House of Commons and Attlee's hurried trip across the ocean to confer with the President. Collins returned with the report that it was MacArthur's position, or conditions, that if he was to continue under the restrictions imposed on him, the war was lost, evacuation was inevitable, and it was unnecessary to seek an armistice since our troops could disembark without one. If, however, we would accept full-scale war with China, MacArthur would be willing to combine the X Corps with the Eighth Army to hold a position across the peninsula as far north as possible. The British took a diametrically opposite stand. They wanted to grant Communist China recognition and a seat in the UN, negotiate a cease-fire around the 38th parallel, and liquidate the conflict.

The American planners decided on a course midway between the

still, and Harry Truman, in the privacy of his diary, was already struggling with it before the rest of the world had even heard of the atomic bomb.

### THE CONTEMPLATED USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

What postwar diplomatic and military uses, if any, were envisaged for what Bernard Baruch in 1946 called America's "winning weapon"? On this critical question, too, Truman vacillated in ways that reflected the larger uncertainty of the American people. In his post-Hiroshima public pronouncements, Truman always insisted that a fundamental objective of U.S. policy was to devise a system of international control that would end U.S. atomic supremacy, forestall a dangerous nuclear arms race, and ensure that the bomb would never again be used. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan of March 1946, to which historians have given much attention, was presented to the world as an expression of this high-minded objective.

At the same time, Truman was clearly prepared to gain whatever strategic advantage he could from the American atomic monopoly, which continued until September 1949, and the country's overwhelming atomic superiority, which lasted considerably longer. As he wrote jauntily to Bess from Potsdam on July 31, 1945, using a metaphor drawn from his favorite game: "I rather think Mr. Stalin is stallin' because he is not so happy over the English elections. [Clement Attlee had replaced Winston Churchill as prime minister.] He doesn't know it but I have an ace in the hole and another one showing—so unless he has threes or two pair (and I know he has not) we are sitting all right." As numerous studies have now demonstrated, all Truman's thinking and decision-making about nuclear weapons, from July 1945 through the end of his presidency, invariably reflected his preoccupation with the U.S.-Soviet power nexus.

As the Cold War worsened, did Truman ever envisage the atomic bomb not only as a diplomatic asset in his maneuverings with the Soviets but as something that actually might be used again? In various public pronouncements, as well as in occasional private communications within the government, Truman firmly rejected such an option. When army secretary Kenneth Royall urged a preemptive nuclear strike against the

Soviets during the 1948 Berlin blockade crisis, Truman made plain that he considered such an action not only unthinkable morally but appalling in its strategic and diplomatic shortsightedness: "You have got to understand that this isn't a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. You have got to understand that I have got to think about the effect of such a thing on international relations. This is no time to be juggling an atom bomb around."

When the Cold War turned hot in Korea, however, Truman himself toyed with the nuclear option. At a news conference on November 30, 1950, after the Chinese had crossed the Yalu River, Truman was asked about the possible use of the atomic bomb. He replied: "There has always been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression." When the respected Merriman Smith of the United Press asked the president explicitly to confirm whether dropping the atomic bomb was, indeed, under "active consideration," he answered tersely: "Always has been. It is one of our weapons." When asked whether the targets being considered were civilian or military, he responded that this was a "matter that the military people have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things. . . . The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of weapons, as he always has."

The newspapers reported the story in banner headlines. A United Press bulletin proclaimed: "PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID TODAY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION USE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR IN KOREA." An alarmed Prime Minister Attlee flew to Washington to dissuade the president from precipitate action.

In her biography of her father, Margaret Truman describes this episode as "all ridiculous, and very disheartening." It was, she writes, a classic example of journalistic distortion and sensationalism. Indeed, she implicitly blames the press's handling of this story for the fatal heart attack suffered a few days later by Truman's old friend and press secretary Charlie Ross. Yet when one reads Truman's clear answers to a series of clear questions, it is difficult to see how the reporters distorted or

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misrepresented his views. Truman's comments, while perhaps merely propaganda bluster, did clearly indicate that use of the atomic bomb in the Korean War, while deeply deplorable, was indeed under "active consideration" and that targeting decisions would be left to "the military commander in the field"—General Douglas MacArthur, who publicly advocated turning the Korean conflict into a war of destruction against Communist China.

In 1952, with his popularity sagging at home and the armistice talks bogged down at Panmunjom, Truman again considered the nuclear option, this time in the form of two memoranda that came to light years later (*New York Times*, August 3, 1980, p. 20). Evidently written to formulate hypothetical options as a way of clarifying his own thinking, they spell out in specific detail a nuclear ultimatum to the Soviets. The first, dated January 27, 1952, says:

It seems to me that the proper approach now would be an ultimatum with a 10-day expiration limit, informing Moscow that we intend to blockade the China coast from the Korean border to Indochina by means now in our control—and if there is further interference we shall eliminate any ports or cities necessary to accomplish our purposes.

This means all-out war. It means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Darien, Odessa, Stalingrad, and every manufacturing plant in China and the Soviet Union will be eliminated.

In the second of these two remarkable memos, written in May 1952, Truman actually drafted his ultimatum to "the Commies": "Now do you want an end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed? You may have one or the other; whichever you want, these lies of yours at this conference have gone far enough. You either accept our fair and just proposal or you will be completely destroyed."

It is important to place these documents in context. Apart from the 1950 news conference mentioned above, Truman in his public pronouncements dismissed all talk of employing atomic weapons in the

Korean War. He had even recalled General MacArthur in April 1951 in part over MacArthur's insistent calls for a wider war. And the Truman administration had firmly rejected NSC 100, the 1951 proposal by Stuart Symington (chairman of the National Security Resources Board) to the National Security Council calling for a nuclear attack on China and possibly the Soviet Union. In this context, historian Gregg Herken is probably correct in suggesting that Truman's Rambo-like private musings are best seen as "more an expression of pique than of policy." Yet in a nuclear age, even pique by a U.S. president cannot be dismissed lightly.

Clearly, Truman's feelings about the military and diplomatic utility of the atomic bomb were ambivalent. He could readily state the compelling arguments against using the bomb (except when looking back on Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and he recognized the terrible dangers of nuclear threats and bluster. Yet when his frustration level rose high enough—whether against Stalin at Potsdam or the Communists in Korea—his thinking invariably circled back to the alluring option of resolving his frustrations once and for all with his ace in the hole.

In this respect, too, Truman's ambivalence mirrored the attitudes of the American public: fearful of the bomb, aware of the horror of nuclear war, yet longing to translate the nation's atomic supremacy into a decisive stroke against the new postwar enemy. Here it is important to note that at least for some Americans, Truman's ringing defense of the use of the atomic bomb against Japan had larger implications. If the bomb was justified against one enemy, they asked, why not against another? As one reader wrote the *New Yorker* after the publication of John Hersey's *Hiroshima* in August 1946, "I read Hersey's report. It was marvelous. No let us drop a handful on Moscow."

During the Korean War, a strong current of opinion emerged in favor of using the atomic bomb. In August 1950, a few weeks after the war began, 28 percent of Americans endorsed this option. When the Chinese entered the war in November, *U.S. News & World Report* noted a "wave of demand" for a nuclear response. A year later, as the conflict dragged on inconclusively, slightly more than half those polled by the Gallup organization supported dropping atomic bombs on "military targets."

Although periodicals like the *Saturday Evening Post* warned that use of the atomic bomb in Korea would surely trigger World War III, other